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ENGLISH CARRIERS' COMMON-LAW RIGHT TO REJECT
UNDECLARED CARGO: THE MYTH OF THE CLOSED-
CONTAINER CONUNDRUM
JOHN R. PAGAN*
When text and reason fail them, modern courts frequently at-
tempt to shore up their sagging constitutional constructs with
materials scavenged from the common law. They use "the good old
law"1 for ornamental purposes as well. Judicial antiquarians fes-
toon their opinions with references to Coke and Mansfield, hoping,
perhaps, that hoariness will ensure credence. Blithely they thumb
through musty reports in search of a convenient precedent, seldom
canvassing enough cases to discover a doctrine's true scope and
path of development. Sometimes bad history makes bad law. But
more often, poorly researched law yields distorted history. This Ar-
ticle will try to correct one such distortion: the claim that, at En-
glish common law, a common carrier's need to protect himself
against insurance fraud warranted his refusing to transport a
container unless the shipper2 revealed the nature and value of the
goods inside.
This fallacy arose as an offshoot of the controversy over whether
airfreight searches conducted solely by airline employees consti-
tuted governmental action subject to fourth amendment restric-
tions. Unlike inspections of passengers' luggage,3 airfreight
i
* Assistant Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William and
Mary. A.B., College of William and Mary. M. Litt., Oxford Umversity, J.D., Harvard Law
School.
1. The phrase is Professor A.W. Brian Simpson's. Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the
History of Contracts, 46 U. CHI. L. REv. 533, 535 (1979).
2. Unless the context indicates otherwise, the term "shipper" refers to any person with a
legal interest in either cargo or luggage. The terms "container," "parcel," "package,"
"cargo," "freight," "goods," "property," and "consignment" encompass baggage travelling
with a passenger as well as unaccompanied shipments, unless a distinction is explicitly
drawn. Throughout this Article, the term "carrier" refers to a common carrier, not to a
private carrier.
3. Federal antihijacking regulations required airlines to search passengers and their lug-
gage for weapons and explosives. The mandatory nature of those inspections made them
governmental action subject to the fourth amendment. See United States v. Davis, 482 F.2d
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searches were permitted," but not compelled,5 by federal law.
Criminal defendants seeking suppression of evidence uncovered in
airfreight searches contended that the government's imprimatur
amounted to a delegation of law enforcement functions to the air-
lines. Thus, the argument went, airline personnel were de facto
federal agents bound by the fourth amendment's probable cause
and warrant requirements. State and federal courts uniformly re-
jected this delegation theory and held the searches private," largely
because they thought the government had not conferred upon air-
lines broader discovery powers than they already possessed at com-
mon law7 by virtue of their status as common carriers.8 The com-
893 (9th Cir. 1973). See also United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 796-99 (9th Cir.
1979) (en banc).
4. Tariffs approved by the Civil Aeronautics Board allowed carriers to search airfreight
consignments. Rule 24, Official Airfreight Rules Tariff, C.A.B. No. 96, provided: "Inspection
of Shipments-All shipments are subject to inspection by the carrier, but the carrier shall
not be obligated to perform such inspection." See 44 J. AIR. L. & CoM. 862, 869-70 (1979).
Section 403(a) of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (1976), required
carriers to file tariffs with the Civil Aeronautics Board. Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. §§ 1388(c) and
1386(b)(1) (1976 & Supp. III 1979), the Board exempted air cargo carriers from the tariff-
filing requirement effective November 9, 1978. 14 C.F.R. § 291.31(a)(1) (1981). The Board's
action was upheld on appeal. National Small Shipments v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 618 F.2d
819 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Because of the Board's action, airlines can no longer cite government-
approved tariffs as the source of their authority to conduct cargo inspections. On January 1,
1983, the Board will lose its authority to require air carriers to file tariffs governing passen-
gem' luggage. 49 U.S.C. § 1551(a)(2)(A) (Supp. III 1979).
5. The federal antihijacking program did not oblige air carriers to search airfreight.
United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d 646 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980); United
States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d 169
(6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
6. Since Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), private searches have been immune
from fourth amendment requirements. See Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649, 656
(1980). See generally W. LAFAvE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.6 (1978 & Supp. 1981); Burkoff,
Not So Private Searches and the Constitution, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 627 (1981); Euller, Pri-
vate Security and the Exclusionary Rule, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 649 (1980); Note,
Private Searches and Seizures: An Application of the Public Function Theory, 48 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 433 (1980).
7. See United States v. Jennings, 653 F.2d 107, 110 (4th Cir. 1981); United States v. Ed-
wards, 602 F.2d 458, 462-63 (lst Cir. 1979); United States v. Gumerlock, 590 F.2d 794, 798,
799 n.17 (9th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399-401 (D.C. Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); Snyder v. State, 585 P.2d 229, 233 (Alaska 1978).
See also United States v. Andrews, 618 F.2d 646, 650 (10th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Bulgier, 618 F.2d 472, 473 n.2, 478 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 843 (1980); United
States v. Crabtree, 545 F.2d 884, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d
1308, 1311-12 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. DeBerry, 487 F.2d 448, 449 n.1, 450 (2d Cir.
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mon law gave a carrier the right to know cargo's nature and value,
these courts declared, and if a shipper failed to furnish that infor-
mation upon demand, the carrier could refuse to accept his prop-
erty for transport. Disclosure served a variety of purposes: "detec-
tion of insurance fraud, detection of rate cheating by improper
declaration of contents, inventory and identification of unclaimed
baggage and parcels, insulation of the carrier from criminal liabil-
ity, ensuring that the carrier's property is not used in the commis-
sion of a crime, . . protection of the carrier's and other shipper's
[sic] property,"9 and avoidance of injury to passengers, carrier em-
ployees, and bystanders.10 "
Most courts based their conclusions about the range of carriers'
common-law discovery rights wholly upon American authorities.
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia
and Sixth Circuits were exceptional in this regard. To lend verisi-
militude to their pronouncements, they sprinkled a few nine-
teenth-century English citations among their footnotes. The Dis-
1973); United States v. Echols, 477 F.2d 37, 39-40 (8th Cir. 1973); United States v. Harding,
475 F.2d 480, 483-84 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 324-25 (2d
Cir. 1972); Gold v. United States, 378 F.2d 588, 591 (9th Cir. 1967); United States v. Blum,
329 F.2d 49, 52 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v. Averell, 296 F. Supp. 1004, 1009-11
(E.D.N.Y. 1969); McConnell v. State, 595 P.2d 147, 149 n.3, 151-52 (Alaska 1979); Stange v.
State, 559 P.2d 650, 651, 655 (Alaska 1977); Bell v. State, 519 P.2d 804, 807 (Alaska 1974);
State v. Fassler, 108 Ariz. 586, -, 503 P.2d 807, 812 (1972); People v. McKinnon, 7 Cal. 3d
899, 913-14, 500 P.2d 1097, 1107, 103 Cal. Rptr. 897, 907 (1972); People v. Sapper, 102 Cal.
App. 301, 305-06, 162 Cal. Rptr. 360, 362-63 (1980); People v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. App.
3d 887, 891-92, 90 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126 (1970); State v. Pohle, 166 N.J. Super. 504, - 400
A.2d 109, 111-14 (1979); People v. DeSantis, 59 App. Div. 2d 257, -_, 399 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516
(1977); People v. Goodman, 51 App. Div. 2d 1008, _ 380 N.Y.S.2d 768, 769-70 (1976);
State v. Morris, 41 N.C. App. 164, 166-67, 254 S.E.2d 241, 243 (1979); State v. Johnson, 569
S.W.2d 808, 810-11 (Tenn. 1978); Chaires v. State, 480 S.W.2d 196, 198-99 (TeL Crim. App.
1972). But see United States v. Newton, 510 F.2d 1149 (7th Cir. 1975) (tariff-authorized
airline inspection is government action if sole purpose of search is to determine whether a
bag contains narcotics and government agents are present and participate); Corngold v.
United States, 367 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1966) (en banc) (tariff-authorized airline inspection con-
stitutes government action if government agents instigate and participate).
8. By statute, holders of Civil Aeronautics Board certificates who are engaged in air trans-
portation of cargo or baggage have the status of common carriers. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1371(a),
1388(d), 1301(3), (10), (11), (24) (1976 & Supp. 11 1979).
9. United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d 169, 173 (6th Cir. 1979) (footnotes omitted).
10. United States v. Edwards, 602 F.2d 458, 463-64 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v.
Pryba, 502 F.2d 391, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. Cangiano, 464 F.2d 320, 324 (2d
Cir. 1972).
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trict of Columbia Circuit's scholarship proved more or less correct,
but when the Sixth Circuit received its historical inspiration, Clio
was bemused.
Citing Crouch v. London & North-Western Railway Co.1 and
Brass v. Maitland,2 along with several American decisions, the
District of Columbia Circuit in United States v. Pryba stated that
modern carriers' inspection privilege "is rooted in the rule of the
common law that common carriers have the right to decline ship-
ment of packages proffered in circumstances indicating contents of
a suspicious, indeed of a possibly dangerous, nature.""3 At best
Crouch supported the court's assertion only tangentially. True, in
Crouch the Common Pleas did say carriers lawfully could "refuse
to take any parcel that they suspect to contain goods of a danger-
ous nature, or require the same to be opened to ascertain the
fact. 1 4 That statement referred, however, to a power created by
statute,15 not to a common-law right.16 Brass, on the other hand,
directly substantiated the District of Columbia Circuit's position.
In Brass, the Queen's Bench held that one who tenders dangerous
freight for carriage by ship must disclose its nature so the master
and crew can intelligently exercise their option to accept or refuse
the consignment.17 A few years later the Common Pleas applied
11. 14 C.B. 255, 139 Eng. Rep. 105 (C.P. 1854).
12. 6 El. & B1. 470, 119 Eng. Rep. 940 (Q.B. 1856).
13. 502 F.2d 391, 399 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (footnote omitted).
14. 14 C.B. at 295, 139 Eng. Rep. at 121 (per Maule, J.). See also 14 C.B. at 291, 139 Eng.
Rep. at 120 (per Jervis, C.J.).
15. The Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 20, § 105, granted rail-
way companies the right "to refuse to take any Parcel that they may suspect to contain
Goods of a dangerous Nature, or require the same to be opened to ascertain the Fact."
16. In all fairness, though, one should note that in The Nitro-glycerine Case [Parrot v.
Wells, Fargo & Co.], 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872), which the District of Columbia Circuit
cited in the same footnote as Crouch, 502 F.2d at 399 n.48, Justice Field, writing for the
Court, discussed Crouch in common-law terms. He said Crouch "recognizes the right of the
carrier to refuse to receive packages offered without being made acquainted with their con-
tents, when there is good ground for believing that they contain anything of a dangerous
character." 82 U.S. at 536.
17. 6 El. & Bl. at 485, 119 Eng. Rep. at 946. Brass also established the rule that, unless
the shipper discloses latent dangers, he impliedly warrants his goods are safe for transport.
See A. LESLIE, THE LAw OP TRANSPORT By RAILWAY 29-31 (1920); A. MOCATrA, M. MUSTILL,
& S. BOYD, SCRUTTON ON CHARTERPARTIEs AND BILLS OP LADING Art. 50 (18th ed. 1974);
Maloof & Krauzlis, Shipper's Potential Liabilities in Transit, 5 MAR. LAW. 175, 176-77
(1980).
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the principle recognized in Brass to a land carrier. 18 Without ques-
tion, then, the limited cargo-refusal right described by the District
of Columbia Circuit actually existed at nineteenth-century English
common law.
The Sixth Circuit portrayed English law far less accurately. Un-
like the District of Columbia Circuit, the Sixth Circuit in United
18. Farrant v. Barnes, 11 C.B. (N.S.) 553, 561-62, 142 Eng. Rep. 912, 915 (C.P. 1862); see
Hill, The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Land, 1978 LLOYD'S MAR. & COM. L.Q. 74, 74.
Relying primarily upon English authorities, Justice Story compiled the following list of ad-
ditional grounds for refusing to receive and carry certain goods:
If a carrier refuses to take charge of goods because his coach is full; or because
the goods are of a nature which will at the time expose them to extraordinary
danger, or to popular rage; or because the goods are not of a sort which he is
accustomed to carry; or because he has no convenient means of carrying such
goods with security; or because they are brought at an unseasonable time:
these will furnish reasonable grounds for his refusal; and will, if true, be a suffi-
cient legal defence to a suit for the non-carriage of the goods.
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILmENTs § 508 (8th ed. E. Bennett Boston 1870)
(1st ed. Cambridge, Mass. 1832) (footnotes omitted). See generally W. MACNAMARA & W.
ROBERTSON, THE LAW OF CARRIERS OF MERCHANDISE AND PASSENGERS BY LAND ch. IV (2d ed.
1908).
Chitty and Temple also stated that "it would be a reasonable excuse for not carrying
goods of great value, either if it appeared that the carrier did not hold himself out as a
person ready to convey all sorts of goods, or that he had no convenient means of conveying
with security such articles." T. CHrrrY & L. TEMPLE, A PRAcTIcAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CARRIERS *24 (Amer. ed. D. Sellers 1857).
According to the treatise writers, a carrier who knew property was extraordinarily valua-
ble could reject it because he did not profess to transport such goods or because, although a
general cargo carrier, he lacked the facilities to safeguard that particular consignment. They
might have added that rejection probably was warranted if the carrier just suspected the
parcel contained something that he did not profess to carry. See Great N. Ry. v. Shepherd,
8 Ex. 30, 39, 155 Eng. Rep. 1246, 1250 (Ex. 1852) (dictum). Note, however, that Story and
Chitty and Temple did not say a carrier who held himself out as willing to transport general
cargo, including valuables, had the right to refuse a parcel of undisclosed worth merely be-
cause he feared, or perhaps even suspected, it might be unusually valuable and thus beyond
his security capabilities. Such an assertion would have been untenable. See section III infra.
Angell made the erroneous claim nonetheless, declaring that "if the owner of the goods will
not tell the carrier what his goods are, and what they are worth, the carrier may refuse to
take them." J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CARRIERS § 125 (3d ed. Boston 1857) (lst
ed. 1849). In support of that proposition, Angell cited Shepherd. An examination of Shep-
herd reveals, however, that Angell's statement was based not upon the court's judgment but
rather upon an argument by counsel. 8 Ex. at 37, 155 Eng. Rep. at 1249. Angell simply
paraphrased the lawyer's quotation of Chief Justice Best's dicta in Riley v. Home, 2 Moo. &
P. 331, 5 Bing. 217, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044 (C.P. 1828). As the text accompanying note 171
infra points out, two years after Shepherd Best's dicta were repudiated in Crouch, a fact
Angell evidently overlooked.
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States v. Rodriguez"9 did more than simply acknowledge the exis-
tence of a common-law right to reject cargo suspected of being
dangerous. After correctly conceding that "at early common law,
carriers apparently lacked authority to inspect packages,"20 the
Sixth Circuit added a misbegotten footnote which said, "Carriers
merely could refuse carriage if the consignor would not state the
nature of the goods. '21 The footnote's use of the adverb "merely"
is incongruous, for, read literally, the statement ascribes to carriers
enormous power: the privilege to invade shippers' privacy at will.
Taken at face value, the Rodriguez footnote asserts that at com-
mon law carriers possessed an unqualified right to decline un-
declared parcels. From the standpoint of English legal history, the
footnote is clearly erroneous. In Crouch, decided in 1854, the Com-
mon Pleas demolished the "broad and general proposition, that,
whatever be the nature or quality of a package delivered to a car-
rier, he is not bound to receive it, unless informed of the descrip-
tion of its contents. '22 The Sixth Circuit did not mention Crouch
in its Rodriguez opinion. However, as authority for its summary of
carriers' cargo-refusal rights, the Sixth Circuit cited The Nitro-
glycerine Case,2" a United States Supreme Court decision which
explicitly adopted Crouch's reasoning.24 Given that citation, we can
only presume the Sixth Circuit meant less than it said. The Sixth
Circuit must not have intended to suggest that a carrier always
could decline to transport undeclared cargo; rather, the court
"merely" meant that under certain circumstances a carrier was
privileged to reject a closed container because the shipper would
not reveal what was inside. Fair enough, but what circumstances
did the court have in mind? The citations in Rodriguez25 indicate
19. 596 F.2d 169 (6th Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 173.
21. Id. at 173 n.10.
22. 14 C.B. at 292, 139 Eng. Rep. at 120 (per Jervis, C.J.). See also Pianciani v. London &
S.W. Ry., 18 C.B. 226, 139 Eng. Rep. 1354 (C.P. 1856); W. MACNAMARA & W. ROBERTSON,
supra note 18, at 62.
23. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524 (1872), cited in United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d at 173
n.10.
24. 82 U.S. at 535. Section III, infra, discusses Crouch in greater detail.
25. In support of the statement quoted in the text accompanying note 21 supra, the Sixth
Circuit cited three cases and a textbook: "Riley v. Home, 5 Bingham's Rpts. 217, 2 Moore &
Payne's Rpts. 331 (1828); Brass v. Maitland, 6 Ellis & Blackburn's Rpts. 470 (1856); Parrott
[Vol. 23:791796
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that, in the Sixth Circuit's view, rejection was warranted if (1) the
shipper would not supply sufficient information to allay the car-
rier's well-founded suspicion that the cargo contained something
dangerous; or (2) the shipper would not furnish the valuation data
which the carrier needed to calculate the proper insurance rate.
The citations in Rodriguez to Brass and The Nitro-glycerine Case
seem designed to support the first proposition. For reasons already
stated, those cases provide ample proof that the common law rec-
ognized such a cargo-refusal privilege. The Sixth Circuit's citation
of Riley v. Home26 apparently was intended to establish the sec-
ond proposition. The evidence shows, however, that the right of
rejection Riley described had no historical basis.
According to the dicta in Riley on which the Sixth Circuit relied,
if a shipper refused to disclose the nature and value of his goods,
the carrier lawfully could decline to take charge of them.27 Chief
Justice William Best, delivering the Court of Common Pleas' judg-
ment, linked the carrier's cargo-refusal privilege to the right to re-
ceive an adequate premium for insuring consignments.28 Ideally, a
v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (The Nitro-Glycerine Case), 15 Wall. 524, 82 U.S. 524, 21 L.Ed. 206
(1872). See generally J. Ridley, The Law of Carriage of Goods by Land, Sea & Air, (Shaw &
Sons, London, 3d ed. 1971) pp. 15-17." United States v. Rodriguez, 596 F.2d at 173 n.10.
26. 2 Moo. & P. 331, 5 Bing. 217, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044 (C.P. 1828).
27. In one part of his judgment, Chief Justice Best remarked:
A carrier has a right to know the value and quality of what he is required to
carry. If the owner of the goods will not tell him what his goods are and what
they are worth, the carrier may refuse to take charge of them; but if he does
take charge of them, he waives his right to know their contents and value.
2 Moo. & P. at 339-40, 5 Bing. at 222, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1046 (emphasis added). Elsewhere
Best asserted:
We have established these points,-that a carrier is an insurer of the goods
which he carries; that he is obliged for a reasonable reward to carry any goods
to the place to which he professes to carry goods that are offered him, if his
carriage will hold them, and he is informed of their quality and value; that he
is not obliged to take a package, the owner of which will not inform him what
are its contents, and of what value they are; that if he does not ask for this
information, or if, when he asks and is not answered, he takes the goods, he is
answerable for their amount, whatever that may be ....
2 Moo. & P. at 341-42, 5 Bing. at 224, 130 Eng. Rep. at 1046-47 (emphasis added). Jasper
Ridley's shipping textbook, which Rodriguez cited, 596 F.2d at 173 n.10, relied upon Best's
dicta as support for the proposition that a "common carrier is apparently entitled to refuse
to carry if the consignor refuses to inform him, at his request, as to the nature of the goods
to be carried." J. RIDLEY, supra note 25, at 15 (citing Riley v. Home).
28. At common law, a carrier was considered an insurer of cargo. See text accompanying
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carrier's premium reflected the level of risk associated with han-
dling particular goods. To a large extent, risk was a function of
worth: the greater the property's value, the greater its chances of
attracting thieves' attention. Since value affected risk and risk de-
termined premium size, value figured prominently in rate compu-
tations. In many instances, however, before a carrier could take
value into account he had to ascertain the contents of a closed par-
cel. Chief Justice Best thought the need for this information cre-
ated a conundrum. On the one hand, if a carrier accepted a pack-
age without inquiring about its contents, he possibly exposed
himself to risks vastly disproportionate to his fee. If he asked ques-
tions, on the other hand, there always was the danger that the
shipper might refuse to answer, putting the carrier right back
where he started. Best saw only one way out of the bind: empower
the carrier to back up his query with a refusal to carry all un-
declared cargo.
The Sixth Circuit obviously considered Best's statements in
Riley an historically sound exposition of nineteenth-century En-
glish common law. Thus, in Rodriguez, the Sixth Circuit seemingly
took the position that, in order to prevent a shipper from obtaining
undeserved insurance coverage, a carrier was entitled to make dis-
closure a prerequisite to acceptance of goods for transport. This
Article will attempt to prove that the Riley dicta and, by exten-
sion, the Rodriguez footnote exaggerated the breadth of English
carriers' common-law right to reject undeclared cargo. It will try to
demonstrate that, owing to the availability of less intrusive ways to
avoid liability, carriers' privilege to exact information by threaten-
ing to deny service actually was much narrower than Chief Justice
Best and the Sixth Circuit indicated.
The rules governing cargo rejection make sense only when
viewed in historical context. We therefore must examine in some
detail the evolution of common-carrier liability. Section I of the
Article traces the history of liability doctrines from the middle
ages through the late eighteenth century, devoting particular at-
tention to ways carriers could escape responsibility for undeclared
property. Section II, which focuses upon the period between 1769
and 1854, describes the development of public-notice disclaimers
note 59 infra.
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and analyzes their role in preventing insurance fraud. Section III
explains that carriers' capacity to avoid liability for undisclosed
valuables obviated any need for a cargo-refusal privilege of the sort
Riley and Rodriguez claim existed under English law. The Conclu-
sion addresses the policy implications of Crouch's prohibition
against unnecessary invasions of shippers' privacy.
I. EVOLUTION OF COMMON-CARRIER LIABILITY FOR PROPERTY Loss
OR DAMAGE: THE TRANSITION FROM DETINUE TO TRESPASS ON THE
CASE
The shipper-carrier relationship is a species of bailment for hire.
During the middle ages, detinue served as the primary means by
which a bailor could compel his bailee either to return his chattel
or compensate him for its value.2 9 Detinue, however, had serious
procedural and substantive shortcomings. The defendant was al-
lowed to plead the general issue and then, aided by possibly per-
jurious oath-helpers, to wage his law, a process hardly conducive to
fair and accurate fact-finding. Return of the bailor's property com-
pletely discharged the bailee even if the chattel suffered damage
while in the bailee's custody. Moreover, the bailee escaped liability
if the chattel no longer existed at the time of suit or if it had
changed form since the bailee took possession of it.
A more comprehensive remedy-trespass on the case-began to
emerge in the latter part of the fourteenth century. Among the new
action's most important progenitors was a 1348 suit against a fer-
ryman,30 a person later generations of lawyers would classify as a
29. For accounts of the history of detinue on a bailment, see J. BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION
TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 325-28 (2d ed. 1979); 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 336-50 (5th ed. 1942); 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW Lecture V (1881); S. MILSOM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAW 266-69 (2d ed. 1981); T. PLUCKNETT, A CON-
CISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 476-80 (5th ed. 1956); 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, THE
HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 169-78 (2d ed. 1898).
30. The Case of the Humber Ferryman [Bukton v. Townsend], 22 Lib. Ass. f. 94, pl. 41
(K.B. 1348). The best text is the one reprinted in the appendix to A. SIMPSON, A HISTORY OF
THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACT. THE RISE OF THE ACTION OF Assumpsrr 623-24 (1975). For
other texts, see C. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND CONTRACT
330 (1949); A. KIRALFY, A SOURcE BOOK OF ENGLISH LAW 187 (1957) [hereinafter cited as A.
KIRALFY, SOURCE BOOK]; T. PLUcKNr, supra note 29, at 470. The case is discussed in J.
BAKER, supra note 29, at 274, 329; S. MiLSOM, supra note 29, at 316-18; and A. SIMPSON,
supra, at 210-13.
The record indicates that the plaintiff sued in "trespass." However, he did not accuse the
1982] 799
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common carrier. The plaintiff sought damages on the ground that
the ferryman had received his mare for safe carriage across the
River Humber and had so overloaded the craft with other animals
that the mare perished.31 The court adjudged the defendant's mis-
conduct actionable, implying that when the ferryman assumed cus-
tody of the mare he placed himself under a legally enforceable
duty to exercise reasonable care; he breached that duty when he
carelessly overloaded the boat.3 2 The Case of the Humber Ferry-
man paved the way for suing negligent carriers in tort.
One easily can surmise that the mare owner did not sue in cove-
nant because the parties had not entered into an agreement under
seal. But why did he choose to sue in tort rather than in detinue?ss
Probably because in trespass and case, unlike detinue, the defen-
dant could not elect compurgation; he had to submit to trial by
defendant of acting by force and arms or contrary to the king's peace. Hence the suit really
involved a forerunner of trespass on the case rather than true trespass. Kiralfy, The Hum-
ber Ferryman and the Action on the Case, 11 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 421 (1953).
31. None of the texts says how the mare died. Maybe the overloaded craft capsized and
she drowned; or perhaps the horse was fatally injured by the other animals crowded onto
the ferry. See A. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 210-11.
32. A. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 205-07, 210-12; 1 T. STREET, THE FOUNDATIONS OF LE-
GAL LIABILITY 186-87 (1906). In the fourteenth century, the carrier's duty of care, unlike that
of an innkeeper, see A. KiRALFY, SOURCE BOOK, supra note 30, at 202-05, was not yet based
upon the custom of the realm. Rather, the duty arose by reason of the carrier's participation
in a voluntary transaction.
33. Professor Samuel Stoljar suggested that the mare owner sued in tort because, inter
alia, detinue did not lie against a carrier. Stoljar, The Early History of Bailment, 1 AM. J.
LEGAL HIsT. 5, 13-14 (1957). He appears to have been incorrect, however. Even if it is true
that the extant medieval sources do not record "one instance of a carrier being sued in
detinue for the loss of goods," id. at 13, the absence of authority does not necessarily prove
Stoljar's contention. As Professor S.F.C. Milsom has observed, the dearth of detinue cases
probably signifies little more than defendants' propensity for pleading the general issue and
waging their law. S. MuSoM, supra note 29, at 267. Dicta in The Carrier's Case [Anon. v.
The Sheriff of London], Y.B. 13 Edw. IV, f.9, pl. 5 (Exch. Ch. 1473), reprinted in 2 SELECT
CASES IN THE EXCHEQUER CHAMBER BEFORE ALL THE JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 1461-1509, at 30
(64 Selden Society, M. Hemmant ed. 1948) directly contradict Stoljar's position. That case
involved the question whether a carrier-bailee who broke open containers and stole the
goods therein committed a felony. Discussing the matter before the king's council in the
Star Chamber, Chief Justice Thomas Bryan of the Common Pleas answered in the negative
and concluded that "there can be no action for these goods except action of detinue etc." Id.
at 31. Bryan treated the carrier like any other type of bailee and considered his potential
liability in detinue to be a matter of settled law. The law of detinue did not materially
change between 1348, when the Case of the Humber Ferryman was adjudicated, and 1473,
when The Carrier's Case was decided. Therefore, unavailability of the writ was not the
reason why the mare owner failed to sue the ferryman in detinue.
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jury. Also, the tort remedies lacked detinue's loopholes. In tort, a
shipper could recover for damage as well as loss, and a carrier
could not exculpate himself merely by returning the bailed chattel.
Had the mare owner sued in detinue for the animal's value, the
ferryman could have avoided having to pay anything by giving the
plaintiff his horse's carcass (assuming it was salvageable, of
course). 4 No wonder the owner eschewed the traditional bailment
remedy and sued in tort!
As trespass on the case developed over the next four centuries,
whenever shippers could avoid the rule against double remedies
they increasingly tended to follow the mare owner's example. By
the eighteenth century, detinue, although theoretically still availa-
ble, had lapsed into relative disuse 5 because actions on the case
occupied the field. Shippers had several sub-categories of case to
choose among." If a carrier misappropriated property, he was sua-
ble in trover for conversion." If he undertook to carry in a particu-
lar manner and breached his promise, the shipper could bring an
action against him in express assumpsit 8 In the absence of an ex-
plicit undertaking, the law implied an assumpsit to exercise rea-
sonable care, and a carrier who failed to perform with the requisite
skill was subject to liability for negligence. 9 But the most sweep-
ing, and thus most important, kind of action on the case originated
in the custom of the realm.4 ° Customary liability, which applied
34. J. BAKER, supra note 29, at 64-65, 331; A. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at 211. Wager was
never possible in trespass; it became unavailable in case no later than the fourth quarter of
the fourteenth century. J. BAKER, supra note 29, at 59 n.23; A. SIMPSON, supra note 30, at
219-20.
35. Writing in 1724, Thomas Wood commented that, due to the rise of actions on the
case, "Actions of Detinue are not so frequently brought as formerly." T. WooD, AN INSTI-
TUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 543 (London 1724).
36. The choice affected pleading and joinder rules but not the validity of disclaimers or
(until late in the nineteenth century) the measure of damages. See Adams, "Hadley v. Bax-
endale" and the Contract/Tort Dichotomy, 8 ANGLO-AMER. L. REV. 147, 151-53 (1979).
37. The action on the case for conversion developed into a useful substitute for detinue
on a bailment in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. See Simpson, The Introduction of
the Action on the Case for Conversion, 75 L.Q. REV. 364 (1959).
38. See C. FIFOOT, supra note 30, at 161; G. PATON, BAILMENT IN THE COMMON LAW 67, 74
(1952).
39. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 163-64 (Oxford 1768).
40. The term "custom of the realm" was employed to distinguish rights and obligations
based on the common law from those arising from special customs, such as the practices of
merchants. Thompson, The Relation of Common Carrier of Goods and Shipper, and Its
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solely to a common carrier4 1 and rested upon the public nature of
his calling, provided a potent yet simple mode of recovery. To ob-
tain redress for property loss or damage, the plaintiff did not have
to prove the carrier promised to use due care or voluntarily under-
took to complete a certain task. Instead, an aggrieved shipper
needed only to invoke the defendant's common status, whence
flowed his obligation to carry safely. Eventually carriers, in con-
trast to all other practitioners of common callings except innkeep-
ers, became strictly liable when sued in customary actions on the
case.
Customary liability underwent a major transformation between
1500 and 1800. St. German's Doctor and Student indicates that in
1530 proof of negligence still was required to hold a common car-
rier responsible for goods lost or injured while in his possession.42
Indeed, during the early and middle years of the sixteenth century,
Incidents of Liability, 38 HARV. L. REv. 28, 47 n.57 (1924).
41. A common carrier was a person who held himself out as willing to serve any shipper
who offered him a reasonable fee to transport the kinds of goods he professed to carry to a
place he professed to serve, provided they were not unfit and his conveyance was not al-
ready full. See Lovett v. Hobbs, 2 Show. K.B. 127, 89 Eng. Rep. 836 (K.B. 1680); Jackson v.
Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1683); Johnson v. Midland Ry., 4 Ex. 367,
154 Eng. Rep. 1254 (Ex. 1849); J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAw 464-65 (New
York 1827); J. STORY, supra note 18, §§ 495, 508. Parliament empowered justices of the
peace to fix the maximum rate carriers could charge. 3 & 4 W. & M., c. 12, § 24 (1691); 21
Geo. 2, c. 28, § 3 (1748). If no rate was set, a carrier could charge a reasonable sum for his
services. See note 96 infra. Magistrates lost some of their regulatory authority in the latter
part of the eighteenth century. See 7 Geo. 3, c. 40, § 61 (1766); 13 Geo. c. 84, § 86 (1773); R.
BURN, THE JUSTICE OF THE PEACE AND PARISH OFFICER 315 (16th ed. J. Burn London 1788)
(1st ed. London 1743). In 1825 a House of Commons committee urged complete deregula-
tion of land-carriage rates. P. ATIYAH, THE RIsE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 507
(1979). Describing the rate-setting statutes as "inoperative, and inapplicable to the present
Times," Parliament repealed them in 1827. 7 & 8 Geo. 4, c. 39 (1827). Thenceforth, except
when special railway rate legislation applied, carriers could charge whatever the traffic
would bear so long as the levy was reasonable.
42. [Y]t ys comonly holden in the lawes of Englande yf a comon caryer go by wayes
that be daungerous for robbyng/ or dryue by nyght or in other vnconuenyent
tyme and be robbed/ or yf he ouer charge a horse whereby he fallyth into the
water or otherwyse/ so that the stuffe ys hurte or empeyred/ that he shall
stande charged for hys mysdemeanoure/ and yf he wolde percase refuse to
carye yt/ onelesse promyse were made vnto hym that he shall not be charged
for noo mysdemeanour that sholde be in hym/ that promyse were voyde/ For it
were agaynste reason and agaynste good maners ....
C. ST. GERMAN, DOCTOR AND STUDENT 261 (f. 100a), Second Dialogue (London 1530) (91
Selden Society, T. Plucknett & J. Barton eds. 1974) (editorial footnotes omitted).
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liability created by operation of law appears to have been less
stringent than liability stemming from an undertaking.43 In a 1553
case, 4 for example, the court held that, because a common carrier
could be compelled to carry certain goods, he was not liable if they
were stolen from him at an inn through no fault of his own,
whereas a private carrier who voluntarily undertook to carry cargo
safely would be liable. Similarly, under the law merchant negli-
gence principles rather than strict liability determined whether sea
carriers had to compensate owners of lost or damaged cargo.46
Toward the end of the sixteenth century, judges began showing
signs of reluctance to excuse nonnegligent common carriers who
lost goods through theft.46 Perhaps influenced by the tough deti-
nue liability rules laid down in Coke's report of Southcote's Case,'7
43. 2 THE REPORTS OF SIR JOHN SPELMAN 225 (94 Selden Society, J. Baker ed. 1977).
44. Anon., Dalison 8, 123 Eng. Rep. 231 (C.P. 1553), discussed in A. SIMPSON, supra note
30, at 32 n.4, 232 n.9, and Beale, The Carrier's Liability: Its History, 11 HAnv. L. REv. 158,
164 n.6 (1897).
45. E. FLETCHER, THE CARRIER'S LIABELITY at xiii, 51-101 (1932).
46. See, e.g., Woodlife's Case, Moore (K.B.) 462, 72 Eng. Rep. 696, Owen 57, 74 Eng. Rep.
897 (Q.B. 1597). See also Bordwell, Property in Chattels III, 29 HARv. L. REv. 731, 746-47
(1916).
47. In his report of Southcote's Case [Southcott v. Bennett], 4 Co. Rep. 83b, 76 Eng. Rep.
1061, 1062 (Q.B. 1601), a detinue action arising out of a gratuitous bailment, Coke claimed
the court held that "to be kept, and to be kept safe, is all one." In other words, a bailee who
accepted goods generally, that is, unconditionally, did so at his peril and, irrespective of
fault, had to compensate the bailor for all losses except those caused by an enemy of the
crown. (The exception reflected the conceptual linkage between the bailee's liability to the
bailor and the bailee's ability to recover from the third-party wrongdoer who dispossessed
him.)
Coke's version was more elaborate than that of other reporters. Compare 4 Co. Rep. 83b,
76 Eng. Rep. 1061, with Cro. Eliz. 815, 78 Eng. Rep. 1041 and the manuscript reprinted in
Beale, Southcott v. Bennett, 13 HARv. L. REv. 43 (1899). In Coggs v. Bernard, 2 Ld. Raym.
909, 913, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 110 (Q.B. 1703), Lord Holt wryly observed that "my Lord Coke
has improved the case in his report of it." Justice Holmes thought Coke's report contained
an accurate statement of medieval and early modern bailment law: "Down to this time [i.e.,
the date when Southcote's Case was decided], at least, it was clear law that, if a person
accepted the possession of goods to keep for another even as a favor, and lost them by
wrongful taking, wholly without his fault, he was bound to make good the loss, unless when
he took possession he expressly stipulated against such a responsibility." 0. HOLMES, supra
note 29, at 179. Street and Holdsworth agreed with Holmes, but Beale, Fletcher, and Paton
took issue with him, claiming Coke exaggerated the severity of pre-1601 law. E. FLETCHER,
supra note 45, at 29-35; 8 W. HoLDSwoRTH, supra note 29, at 259; G. PATON, supra note 38,
at 76; 2 T. STREET, supra note 32, at 302 n.7. Siding with Holmes's critics, Milsom maintains
that freedom from fault excused a bailee from liability for lost chattels in the fourteenth
century. S. MiLSoM, supra note 29, at 267-69. Milsom notes, however, that a "stiffening of
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seventeenth-century courts moved closer, step by step, to holding
common carriers strictly liable in customary actions on the case.
They did so by treating carriers as public utilities. Like innkeepers,
common carriers were regarded as having impliedly warranted
against theft, irrespective of who was at fault.48 Early in the seven-
teenth century, shippers who grounded their right to recover on
common carriers' special status cautiously hedged their bets by in-
cluding allegations of fault in their declarations.49 By 1638, how-
ever, an accusaticn of negligence probably was superfluous in a
customary action on the case for the value of goods stolen while in
the carrier's custody.50 In 1672 sea carriers became strictly liable at
common law for thefts committed infra corpus comitatus.5 1 As Ba-
con's Abridgment put it, strict liability "was introduced the better
to secure People in their Dealings, and to prevent Carriers, who are
often intrusted with Things of the greatest Value, from confederat-
ing with Robbers, &c. ''52
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Chief Justice John
liability" occurred in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Id. at 269. Southcote's Case con-
solidated that process, and thereafter bailees could not plead robbery as a defense to deti-
nue. Id.
Southcote's Case was cited in several reported actions on the case against carriers. Beale,
supra note 44, at 162. Because Southcote's Case involved detinue, not case, judges treated it
as persuasive rather than as binding authority.
48. See E. FLETCHER, supra note 45, at 112-16; Beale, supra note 44, at 163, 165.
49. See, e.g., Rich v. Kneeland, Cro. Jac. 330, 79 Eng. Rep. 282, Hobart 17, 80 Eng. Rep.
168 (Exch. Ch. 1613). The record is printed in A. KIRALFY, SOURCE BOOK, supra note 30, at
209.
50. George v. Wiburn (K.B. 1638), reported in 1 H. ROLLE, UN ABRIDGMENT DES
PLUSIEURS CXSES ET RESOLUTIONS DEL COMMON LEY 6, pl. 4 (London 1668), translated in 1
C. VINER, A GENERAL ABRIDGMENT OF LAW AND EQUITY 242, pl. 4 (Aldershot, England 1741).
George is discussed in E. FLETCHER, supra note 45, at 117. According to Rolle, in 1668 courts
applied this general rule: "If a Man delivers Goods to a common Carrier to carry to a certain
Place, if he loses them, an Action upon the Case lies against him; for by the common Cus-
tom of the Realm he ought to carry them safely." 1 H. ROLLE, supra, at 2, pl. 1, translated
in 1 C. VINER, supra, at 219, pl. 1. The three subsidiary rules that follow in that same
section ("Action sur Case (C) Vera Carrier") suggest, however, that although common carri-
ers were strictly liable in case for goods lost through robbery, see id. pl. 4, liability for losses
caused in other ways still depended upon proof of negligence, see id. pls. 3 & 4.
51. Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 190, 238, 86 Eng. Rep. 129, 159, 2 Lev. 69, 83 Eng. Rep. 453, Sir
T. Raym. 220, 83 Eng. Rep. 115, 2 Keble 866, 84 Eng. Rep. 548, 3 Keble 72, 84 Eng. Rep.
601, 3 Keble 112, 84 Eng. Rep. 624, 3 Keble 135, 84 Eng. Rep. 638, 1 Mod. 85, 86 Eng. Rep.
752 (K.B. 1672).
52. 1 M. BACON, A NEW ABRIDGMENT OF THE LAW 345 (Carriers B) (5th ed. Dublin 1786)
(1st ed. London 1736-66).
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Holt uttered an expression that enabled later jurists, most notably
Lord Mansfield, to expand the scope of strict liability beyond
theft. In Coggs v. Bernard, Holt said a common carrier must trans-
port goods safely "against all events but acts of God and of the
enemies of the King."53 Sir William Jones considered "act of God"
synonymous with "inevitable accident."" In his view, negligence
remained a prerequisite to holding a carrier responsible for loss or
damage caused in any manner other than robbery.55 Dr. Eric
Fletcher, the leading modern authority on common-carrier liabil-
ity, thought Jones's exegesis accurately captured Holt's meaning.5 6
But in Forward v. Pittard,57 a 1785 decision rendered just four
years after Jones's essay appeared, Mansfield gave the Coggs dic-
tum a far different reading. To Mansfield, the phrase "act of God"
did not simply mean any form of loss, save theft, that happened
without the carrier's negligence. Rather, it meant "something in
opposition to the act of man," that is, "such act as could not hap-
pen by the intervention of man, as storms, lightning, and
tempests." 58 Mansfield's meteorological definition of "act of God"
prevailed. With the exception thus narrowed, common carriers be-
came strictly liable for loss or damage resulting from fire, collision,
theft, and every other source except natural phenomena and for-
eign foes. Mansfield neatly summarized this principle when he
said:
53. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 918, 92 Eng. Rep. 107, 112 (Q.B. 1703). Holt offered the following
explanation for subjecting common carriers to extraordinary liability
For though the force be never so great, as if an irresistible multitude of people
should rob him, nevertheless he is chargeable. And this is a politick establish-
ment, contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of all persons, the ne-
cessity of whose affairs oblige them to trust these sorts of persons, that they
may be safe in their ways of dealing; for else these carriers might have an op-
portunity of undoing all persons that had any dealings with them, by combin-
ing with thieves, &c. and yet doing it in such a clandestine manner, as would
not be possible to be discovered.
Id.
54. W. JoNEs, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS 105 (London 1781) (italics omitted).
55. Id. at 104 (italics omitted). Jones attributed the special robbery rule to the need to
prevent the formation of "confederacies . . .between carriers and desperate villains with
little or no chance of detection." Id.
56. E. FLETCHER, supra note 45, at 156-68.
57. 1 T.R. 27, 99 Eng. Rep. 953 (K.B. 1785).
58. 1 T.R. at 33, 99 Eng. Rep. at 956-57. See also Mansfield's judgment in Proprietors of
the Trent Navigation v. Ward, 3 Esp. 127, 131, 170 Eng. Rep. 562, 563 (K.B. 1785).
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[T]here are events for which the carrier is liable independent of
his contract. By the nature of his contract, he is liable for all due
care and diligence; and for any negligence he is suable on his
contract. But there is a further degree of responsibility by the
custom of the realm, that is, by the common law: a carrier is in
the nature of an insurer. It is laid down that he is liable for
every accident, except by the act of God, or the King's
enemies. 59
By definition, a common carrier had to serve all comers. If he
wrongfully refused to accept a consignment, he was suable in
tort.60 The twin policies of strict liability and compulsory transport
were not unfair, Mansfield reasoned, because the carrier could pro-
tect himself by adjusting his security measures and his fees to
comport with the risk he was forced to assume."1 Whenever valu-
ables were entrusted to his care, he could lock them in a fireproof
safe or strongbox, post extra guards, or take other action aimed at
reducing the danger of liability-producing loss or damage. The cost
of this added protection could then be spread among shippers
through increased freight rates.
In order for the insurance system to work as intended, however,
a carrier had to find out every shipment's nature and value. With-
out that information he could not assess potential risks, employ
appropriate safeguards, and prevent the shipper from cheating him
of his just reward. Closed containers impeded acquisition of crucial
data; thus they hindered performance of carriers' assigned fuhc-
tions and invited shipper fraud. Holding a carrier strictly liable for
goods he knew nothing about produced such obvious unfairness
that a mitigating doctrine had to be devised. Judges had available
to them at least four possible solutions: allow the carrier to plead
ignorance of contents as a defense to actions on the case; permit
him to contract out of liability for undisclosed property; empower
59. 1 T.R. at 33, 99 Eng. Rep. at 956 (emphasis added). "This case must be regarded as
the one which established the keystone in the arch of carrier's liability." G. PATON, supra
note 38, at 87.
60. Jackson v. Rogers, 2 Show. K.B. 327, 89 Eng. Rep. 968 (K.B. 1684); Johnson v. Mid-
land Ry., 4 Ex. 367, 154 Eng. Rep. 1254 (Ex. 1849); Crouch v. London & N.W. Ry., 14 C.B.
255, 139 Eng. Rep. 105 (C.P. 1854). See also notes 18 & 41 supra.
61. See Lord Mansfield's judgment in Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298, 2300, 98 Eng.
Rep. 199, 200 (K.B. 1769). See also Barclay v. Cuculla y Gana, 3 Dougl. 389, 390-91, 99 Eng.
Rep. 711, 712 (K.B. 1784).
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him to search closed containers; or authorize him to reject un-
declared cargo. They adopted the second approach and either ex-
plicitly or implicitly disapproved the other three.
The first approach would have brought trespass on the case into
conformity with detinue. As early as 1315, courts allowed bailees to
plead ignorance of contents as a defense to detinue. The bailee in
Bowdon v. Pelleter62 argued that she should not be held liable in
detinue for the bailor's lost jewelry and other chattels because (1)
the bailed goods were delivered in a locked chest and she was not
apprised of their presence; and (2) the chest was carried off by
thieves through no fault of her own. 3 The bailor, in turn, (1) de-
nied that the chattels were hidden from view in a chest when
bailed; and (2) denied that they were stolen. The parties having
joined issue on each point, both questions of fact were submitted
to a jury. 4 No record of Bowdon's outcome survives, and historians
disagree as to whether robbery excused a nonnegligent bailee from
liability in the fourteenth century.15 One point seems clear, though:
the court would not have asked the jury to determine how much
the bailee knew unless liability for property inside a closed
container depended upon awareness of its nature and value.
The ignorance-of-contents defense recognized in Bowdon appar-
ently remained available in detinue actions until at least the eight-
eenth century.6 Even Coke, who considered carriers and other
62. Y.B. 8 Ed. II (C.P. 1315), reprinted in 17 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II 136 (41 Selden
Society, W. Bolland ed. 1925) [hereinafter cited as YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II].
63. The bailee said the thieves stole some of her goods as well as the bailor's. Id. at 136-
37. By implying that she had taken as much care of the bailor's property as of her own, the
bailee tried to show she had not acted negligently. Id. at xxiv. See also 2 T. STREET, supra
note 32, at 256-57.
64. Both parties requested a jury trial. 17 YEAR BOOKS OF EDWARD II, supra note 62, at
137.
65. See note 47 supra.
66. See T. WOOD, supra note 35, at 543. Wood said a common carrier, unlike an ordinary
bailee, could not invoke the ignorance defense if he accepted goods unconditionally. Id. Al-
though Wood made that comment in the midst of his detinue discussion, the authority he
cited in support of his proposition-Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 238, 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (K.B.
1672)-dealt with defenses to actions on the case rather than with detinue defenses. Igno-
rance did not excuse a carrier from liability if the shipper sued him in trespass on the case.
See text accompanying notes 69-77 infra. However, we have no reason to doubt that igno-
rance was a good plea to a detinue action against a carrier qua bailee. Wood probably skip-
ped over carriers' dotinue defenses and moved right into the niceties of case because by 1724
shippers largely ignored detinue, preferring to sue in case instead.
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bailees strictly liable in detinue for goods accepted uncondition-
ally,6 7 acknowledged the defense's legitimacy. According to Coke's
report of Southcote's Case, if the bailor (whom Coke denominated
"A.") failed to tell the bailee ("B.") what items his chest con-
tained, "B. shall not be charged, for A. did not trust B. with them,
nor did B. undertake to keep them, as it is adjudged in 8 E. 2
[Bowdon]."6 s In other words, a bailee did not assume legal respon-
sibility for goods unless he knew he had been entrusted with them.
Regardless of whether Coke's rather formalistic entrustment the-
ory or a more basic fairness principle furnished Bowdon's ratio-
nale, the ignorance-of-contents defense prevented bailor fraud and
obviated any need for a bailee to search or reject closed containers.
For reasons that remain obscure, courts declined to extend the
Bowdon rule beyond detinue. Consequently, the ignorance-of-con-
tents defense declined in practical importance as trespass on the
case gradually replaced detinue. Kenrig v. Eggleston,9 a 1648 deci-
sion, evinced judges' unwillingness to recognize ignorance as an in-
dependent defense to an action on the case. The plaintiff in Kenrig
wished to ship a box containing a book, some tobacco, and £100
via the defendant's coach line. Had the carrier known the cargo
included money, he would have added a £3 insurance premium to
the ordinary freight rate. To avoid this extra charge, the shipper
told the carrier's porter about the book and the tobacco but failed
to mention the £100. Someone stole the box while it was in transit,
and the owner sued on the custom of the realm to recover its ac-
tual value. King's Bench Justice Henry Rolle, sitting in the Guild-
hall at nisi prius, instructed the jury that the shipper was under
no duty to "tell the carrier all the particulars in the box."70 The
shipper had, of course, done more than simply refrain from giving
information. By disclosing the less risky items but not the money,
he had deliberately misled the carrier. This type of misrepresenta-
tion was an "intended cheat, 7 1 to be sure, but in Rolle's view the
67. See note 47 supra.
68. 4 Co. Rep. 83b, 83b-84a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1062 (Q.B. 1601). See also E. COKE, THE
FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF ENGLAND, OR, A COMMENTARIE UPON Lrr-
TLETON § 123 at 89a-89b (London 1628).
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shipper's acts only furnished a basis for mitigating damages rather
than a complete defense. He left to the jurors' discretion the task
of deciding how much the damages should be reduced due to the
shipper's fraud. They returned a verdict for £97, merely diminish-
ing the shipper's recovery by the amount of the insurance premium
he would have been obliged to pay had he accurately disclosed the
box's contents. 2
Kenrig and a similar case decided a couple of decades later73 tac-
itly disagreed with Bowdon's conclusion that ignorance should ex-
cuse a bailee from liability for theft. In Coggs v. Bernard,74 Chief
Justice Holt attacked Bowdon directly, saying he could not
see the reason ... why the bailee should not be charged with
goods in a chest, as well as with goods out of a chest. For the
bailee has as little power over them, when they are out of a
chest, as to any benefit he might have by them, as when they are
in a chest; and he has as great power to defend them in one case
as in the other.75
Holt's comments were patently illogical. The degree of care needed
to defend chattels depended upon their nature and value. If goods
were "out of a chest," i.e., visible, when delivered to the bailee, he
was able to estimate their worth, calculate risks, and take neces-
sary precautions. But since "no man can proportion his care to the
nature of things, without knowing them, 7 the bailee of "goods in
a chest" could not, except by sheer fortuity, give them the same
protection he would have provided had he known what they were.
Despite Holt's flawed reasoning, his opinion became the accepted
72. The verdict was for the money only, "the other things being of no considerable value."
To some the verdict seemed unduly harsh, prompting the reporter to remark, "quod durum
videbatur circumstantibus." Id.
73. In Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 238, 238, 86 Eng. Rep. 159, 160 (K.B. 1672), Chief Justice
Matthew Hale referred to a recent case with facts like Kenrig's. When asked what his box
contained, the shipper replied that "it was filled with silks and such like goods of mean
value." Id. He omitted to mention, no doubt intentionally, that the box also contained a
large sum of money. The carrier accepted the parcel unconditionally and was later robbed.
Disregarding both the shipper's falsehood and the carrier's ignorance of the box's true con-
tents, the court held the carrier liable for everything, including the money. See note 80
infra.
74. 2 Ld. Raym. 909, 92 Eng. Rep. 107 (Q.B. 1703).
75. 2 Ld. Raym. at 914, 92 Eng. Rep, at 110.
76. W. JONES, supra note 54, at 38 (italics omitted).
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rule governing actions on the case. By the latter part of the eight-
eenth century, Jones reported, it was "generally understood, that a
common carrier is answerable for the loss of a box or parcel, be he
ever so ignorant of its contents, or be those contents ever so valua-
ble 7 unless he accepted the goods specially.
Properly employed, the special acceptance7 8 shielded trespass-
on-the-case defendants from undeserved liability as effectively as
the ignorance-of-contents defense sheltered detinue defendants.
The term "acceptance" had two related but distinct meanings.
First, it referred to the act by which a carrier acquired physical
custody of a shipper's goods. Second, it denoted a carrier's assump-
tion of legal responsibility for property. The words "general" and
"special" modified "acceptance" when used in the second sense.
The modifiers indicated the terms under which a carrier was will-
ing to expose himself to potential liability. Unless the parties stip-
ulated otherwise, a carrier's acceptance was deemed general, which
meant he insured the cargo in accordance with the custom of the
realm. Put more precisely, in return for payment of the ordinary
freight rate, which usually was based upon a parcel's size, weight,
and destination rather than upon the value of its contents, the car-
rier assumed an unconditional obligation to indemnify the shipper
for any loss or damage not caused by an act of God or the king's
enemies. A special acceptance, by contrast, created only a qualified
duty to compensate an aggrieved shipper. To recover the value of
specially accepted cargo, a shipper had to satisfy whatever condi-
tions precedent to insurance coverage the parties adopted when
the goods were bailed. Two conditions became standard features of
carriage contracts: a requirement that the shipper reveal the na-
ture and value of his consignment, and a requirement that he pay
an insurance premium in addition to the basic transport fee.
77. Id. at 106 (italics omitted).
78. The special acceptance originated as a detinue defense. In a note following his report
of Southcote's Case, 4 Co. Rep. 83b, 84a, 76 Eng. Rep. 1061, 1063 (Q.B. 1601), Coke advised
bailees to use special acceptances to insulate themselves from detinue liability- "Nota
reader, it is good policy for him who takes any goods to keep, to take them in special man-
ner, scil. to keep them as he keeps his own goods, or to keep them the best he can at the
peril of the party; or if they happen to be stolen or purloined, that he shall not answer for
them; for he who accepteth them, ought to take them in such or the like manner, or other-
wise he may be charged by his general acceptance." See also E. CoKE, supra note 68, § 123
at 89b.
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The carrier's failure to use a special acceptance explains the re-
sult in Kenrig.79 He easily could have protected himself against
fraud by telling the shipper that he would not take responsibility
for undisclosed money. Such a warning would have forced the ship-
per either to declare the money and pay an extra fee, thereby plac-
ing the risk of theft on the carrier, or to ship the parcel uninsured,
bearing all risks himself. Instead of safeguarding himself in this
manner, the defendant in Kenrig accepted the box generally, giv-
ing the dishonest shipper the best of both worlds: a low freight rate
and full insurance coverage.
To accept goods specially, a carrier had to follow certain proce-
dures. If the shipper did not volunteer information, the carrier had
to ask him pointblank what his parcel contained. A question di-
rected at the public at large did not suffice: the carrier had to in-
terrogate shippers individually. Moreover, inquiries alone were not
enough to bring the special acceptance into play. The carrier also
had to caution shippers that he considered certain kinds of prop-
erty so risky that he would not insure them at his standard rate.80
As the volume of England's internal carrying trade grew over the
course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,8 ' however, re-
quiring carriers to ask questions of, and explain liability limita-
79. In his charge to the jury in Kenrig, Justice Rolle drew particular attention to the
carrier's failure to make a special acceptance. Aleyn 93, 93, 82 Eng. Rep. 932, 932 (N.P.
1648).
80. In Morse v. Slue, 1 Vent. 238, 86 Eng. Rep. 159 (K.B. 1672), Chief Justice Hale
stressed the warning requirement's importance:
There was a case (not long since) when one brought a box to a carrier, in which
there was a great sum of money, and the carrier demanded of the owner what
was in it, he answered, that it was filled with silks and such like goods of mean
value; upon which the carrier took it, and was robbed. And resolved that he
was liable. But if the carrier had told the owner, that it was a dangerous time,
and if there were money in it, he durst not take charge of it; and the owner
had answered as before, this matter would have excused the carrier.
1 Vent. at 238, 86 Eng. Rep. at 160 (emphasis added). By saying "he durst not take charge
of it," the carrier would have communicated either of two messages: that he was not a com-
mon carrier of money owing to his inability to protect it; or that, although a common carrier
of money, he refused to accept legal responsibility for it in return for only an ordinary fee
(implying that he would do so upon payment of a surcharge).
81. See J. CHARTRES, INTERNAL TRADE IN ENGLAND 1500-1700, at 39-46 (1977); E. PAWSON,
TRANSPORT AND ECONoMy: THE TURNPIKE ROADS oF EIGHTEENTH CENTURY BRITAIN 15-60
(1977); Chartres, Road Carrying in England in the Seventeenth Century: Myth and Real-
ity, 30 ECON. HiST. REv. 73 (2d ser. 1977).
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tions to, individual shippers proved increasingly impractical.
Judges responded to these new circumstances by liberalizing the
special acceptance. Tyly v. Morrice,2 a 1699 case, recognized the
validity of implied conditions of acceptance and sanctioned carri-
ers' use of written receipts as disclaimers of liability for undis-
closed valuables. Tyly was an action on the custom of the realm
against a carrier from whom robbers had stolen £450 belonging to
the plaintiffs. The carrier's defense rested on his receipt, which
promised to transport and deliver only £200, the sum the shippers
had said their bags contained, in consideration for a "carriage and
risque" fee of ten shillings per £100. The receipt did not expressly
exclude liability for cash in excess of £200. Nevertheless, treating
the receipt as a de facto special acceptance, Chief Justice Holt held
that the shipper could not recover more than £200. The receipt let
the shippers know "there was a particular undertaking. . . for the
carriage of [£200] only"83 and told them the carrier expected a fee
commensurate with his responsibility. By "defraud[ing] the carrier
of his reward," Holt concluded, the shippers "barred themselves of
that remedy which is founded only on the reward."" Ultimately,
however, it was the shippers' failure to satisfy the implied condi-
tions precedent to liability-disclosure of the cargo's real worth
and payment of the proper premium-and not their subjective in-
tent which led to Holt's decision in the carrier's favor.
Fraudulent intent acquired greater independent significance a
couple of decades later when judges began to realize that, despite
carriers' ability to use receipts in lieu of oral disclaimers, special
acceptances did not provide complete protection against misrepre-
sentation and nondisclosure of packages' contents. To use special
acceptances effectively, carriers had to include conditions as part
of each transaction either by issuing individual receipts or by giv-
ing particularized oral warnings. From time to time careless carrier
employees forgot to hand a shipper his receipt or ask him the right
questions, thereby enabling a swindler to ship his valuables at or-
dinary rates and still reap full insurance benefits if they were lost
or damaged. To plug this loophole, Sir Peter King, chief justice of
82. Carthew 485, 90 Eng. Rep. 879, Holt, K.B. 9, 90 Eng. Rep. 903 (N.P. 1699).
83. Carthew at 486, 90 Eng. Rep. at 880, Holt, K.B. at 10, 90 Eng. Rep. at 903.
84. Id.
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the Common Pleas, tried to develop a fraud defense complemen-
tary to, yet separate from, the special acceptance. In a 1719 case,
Titchburne v. White,85 King suggested that even though a carrier
failed to accept cargo specially, he still escaped liability if the ship-
per lied to him about its nature and value: "if the carrier asks
[whether a parcel contains money], and the other says no, or if he
accepts it conditionally, provided there is no money in it, in either
of these cases I hold the carrier is not liable."8
A couple of decades later, however, in Drinkwater v. Quenel187
the Common Pleas tacitly rejected the notion that misrepresenta-
tion independently barred a shipper's recovery. The carrier in
Drinkwater told the shipper's agent that he would not transport
money unless notified in advance and paid five shillings per hun-
dred pounds. Later the shipper hid £200 in a parcel which his
agent's servant delivered to the carrier. The servant said the parcel
contained silk and paid a freight charge of one shilling and three
pence, far less than the ten shilling premium he ought to have paid
for the money alone. The parcel was lost and the court, relying on
Kenrig, held the carrier liabile for all its contents, including the
£200. Delivering a unanimous judgment that ignored Tyly and
Titchburne, Chief Justice John Willes took the position that the
special acceptance constituted carriers' sole protection against
fraud, saying, "as to the fraud in this case, we are all of opinion,
that a man is not obliged to let a carrier know what is in a parcel,
and therefore he may disguise it; for he may accept it specially."88
85. 1 Strange 145, 93 Eng. Rep. 438 (N.P. 1719). According to the English Reports,
Titchburne was decided on "16 Febr. 1618." Obviously "1618" is a printer's error. The judg-
ment is reported in a section of Sir John Strange's reports devoted to the decisions of Hilary
Term in the fifth year of George Is reign, which began on August 1, 1714. Strange notes
that the case was tried at the Guildhall by Chief Justice King of the Common Pleas. Henry
Hobart waschief justice of Common Pleas in 1618; Sir Peter King held that office in 1718. 6
E. Foss, THE JUDGES OF ENGLAND 330 (London 1864); 8 id. at 135. Therefore, Titchburne
must have been decided in February 1718/19.
86. 1 Strange at 145, 93 Eng. Rep. at 438 (emphasis added).
87. 7 Mod. 248, 87 Eng. Rep. 1220 (C.P. 1738).
88. 7 Mod. at 249, 87 Eng. Rep. at 1221. Willes claimed disclosure "might be an encour-
agement for robberies rather than an hindrance." Id. George Joseph Bell later elaborated on
this theme: "It is not always safe, and in the hurry of travelling quite intolerable, that one
should be required to show money or jewels in the confusion of a coachyard, or to undo a
package, or turn out the contents of a portmanteau, to satisfy a carrier or stage-coachman."
1 G. BELL, COMMENrARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND, AND ON THE PRINCILES OF MERCANTILE
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Willes's special acceptance required more than a simple refusal to
assume responsibility for undeclared valuables on which no insur-
ance premium had been paid. A carrier had to demand disclosure
and state his disclaimer at the time the container actually changed
hands. The defendant in Drinkwater neglected to utter the magic
incantation at the proper time and therefore, notwithstanding his
earlier warning, remained unconditionally answerable for every-
thing in the parcel. Judicial pedantry of the sort displayed in
Drinkwater impaired the special acceptance's utility until 1769,
when Lord Mansfield and his fellow King's Bench justices sanc-
tioned a streamlined method of limiting liability for undeclared
cargo.
II. DEVELOPMENT AND REGULATION OF PUBLIC-NOTICE
DISCLAIMERS, 1769-1854
Gibbon v. Paynton89 marked a turning point in the history of
common-carrier liability because it authorized the public-notice
disclaimer, a device which enabled carriers to employ special ac-
ceptances routinely, thereby reducing their vulnerability to insur-
ance fraud. Gibbon was a suit against a stagecoachman for the loss
of £100 which the shipper had concealed in hay inside "an old nail-
bag."90 When the coachman took custody of the nail-bag, he did
not make any inquiries, state any conditions, or issue a receipt.
Had the case arisen in the seventeenth or early eighteenth century,
the coachman's acceptance probably would have been considered
general. Nevertheless, Mansfield and his brethren excused the car-
rier from liability on the ground that he had, in fact, accepted the
nail-bag specially by informing the public, through handbills and
newspaper advertisements, that he would not accept responsibility
for undeclared money, jewels, and other extraordinarily valuable
property. The carrier was unable to prove the plaintiff actually saw
one of these notices, but he did produce evidence showing that the
plaintiff knew special conditions governed transportation of
money. The court regarded concealment of money in the face of a
JURISPRUDENCE 500 (7th ed. J. M'Laren Edinburgh 1870) (1st ed. Edinburgh 1804). See also
Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264, 271, 128 Eng. Rep. 105, 108 (C.P. 1810).
89. 4 Burr. 2298, 98 Eng. Rep. 199 (K.B. 1769).
90. Id.
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constructive special acceptance as a form of fraud because it de-
prived the carrier of a chance to take adequate precautions and
cheated him of his rightful compensation. Following the maxim
"Ex dolo malo non oritur Actio,"9 1 the court denied recovery.
Gibbon relaxed the rigid timing rule laid down in Drinkwater by
allowing carriers to post or publish general disclaimer notices in
advance of any particular transaction. Provided a shipper somehow
learned about the notice's terms, he had to adhere to them in all
his subsequent dealings with the carrier whether or not they were
reiterated on those occasions. Besides operating prospectively,
multitransactional disclaimers fought fraud wholesale, eliminating
the need to question shippers individually. They reduced the dan-
ger of employee oversights and required less effort to administer
than receipts.2 Moreover, they brought fairness to the common
91. 4 Burr. at 2300, 98 Eng. Rep. at 200 (per Mansfield, C.J.). Like his brethren, Lord
Mansfield attached importance to the carrier's notices and the commercial customs they
reflected. But his primary theme was the equitable principle that persons who act with
fraudulent intent should not profit from their wrongdoing. His dicta suggest that he, like
Chief Justice King in Titchburne, was willing to recognize shipper fraud as an independent
defense to common-carrier liability. Mansfield argued that Rolle and Hale erred in holding
carriers liable simply because they neglected to observe the special acceptance's formalities.
Kenrig was wrongly decided, Mansfield asserted, because the shipper in that case commit-
ted fraud when he told the carrier about the book and the tobacco but not the money. Thus,
Mansfield found himself in agreement with those who thought the plaintiff's award harsh
and unjust. See note 72 supra. He criticized the decision cited by Hale in Morse v. Slue, see
notes 73 & 80 supra, for much the same reason. Mansfield thought it absurd to award dam-
ages to a shipper who had "artfully concealed" money in a box said to contain only goods of
little value merely because the carrier "had not expressly proposed a caution against being
answerable for money." 4 Burr. at 2301, 98 Eng. Rep. at 200.
To Mansfield, only Holt's jury instructions in Tyly adhered faithfully to "the true princi-
ples." Id. Conveniently ignoring the fact that Tyly involved a receipt which functioned as an
implied special acceptance, Mansfield interpreted Holt's ruling as standing for the broad
proposition "'that the carrier was liable only for what he was fairly told of.'" Sir James
Burrow, who reported Gibbon, put quotation marks around Mansfield's statement and indi-
cated that the chief justice took the words from "The Case of Sir Joseph Tyly and Others
against Morrice, in Carthew, 485." Id. The language attributed to Tyly appears neither in
Carthew's report nor in the only other printed report of the case, Holt, K.B. 9, 90 Eng. Rep.
903. Hence, the phrase set out in quotation marks in Gibbon must be Mansfield's own, not
Holt's (unless Mansfield quoted Tyly accurately and Burrow garbled the excerpt).
In any event, largely as a result of the holding in Gibbon, which legitimated public-notice
disclaimers, special acceptances became so widely used that Mansfield's successors seldom
had occasion to ponder the need for an independent fraud defense.
92. From an evidentiary standpoint, however, receipts were superior to notices. The effec-
tiveness of any type of special acceptance depended upon proof that the shipper had actual
knowledge of its terms. Several judges cautioned carriers to use receipts instead of notices
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law's transport insurance system, for if a person dissembled or re-
mained silent in the face of a notice predicating liability upon dis-
closure of valuables and payment of a premium, any loss or dam-
age fell on him, not on the carrier.
Public-notice disclaimers, like individual special acceptances, op-
erated contractually. A carrier could not unilaterally alter his com-
mon-law liability,93 but by agreement with the shipper he could
replace implied terms with express provisions. The notice consti-
tuted an offer to do business on a noncustomary basis, and accept-
ance occurred when the shipper, knowing of the offer, tendered
goods for carriage.9 The resulting express contract modified the
underlying implied contract in either of two ways, depending upon
the type of notice used. The most common variety usually read
something like this: "[C]ash, plate, jewels, writings, or any such
kind of valuable articles, will not be accounted for if lost, [if] of
more than [25] value, unless entered as such, and a penny insur-
ance paid for each pound value . . . .", Once assented to, this
kind of notice made the carrier's common-law liability contingent
upon both declaration of value and payment of a surcharge.96 Since
failure to fulfill either requirement completely barred recovery,9 7
because it was easier to show that a shipper knew what a receipt said than to prove he read
a newspaper advertisement or a sign posted on an office wall. See Kerr v. Willan, 6 M. & S.
150, 152, 105 Eng. Rep. 1199, 1200 (K.B. 1817); Rowley v. Home, 3 Bing. 2, 3, 130 Eng. Rep.
413, 414 (C.P. 1825); Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, 222, 130 Eng. Rep. 753, 754 (C.P.
1827).
93. Kirkman v. Shawcross, 6 T.R. 14, 17-18, 101 Eng. Rep. 410, 412 (K.B. 1794) (dictum).
94. Eighteenth and early nineteenth-century cases analyzing the legal significance of car-
riers' notices did not employ modern "offer and acceptance" terminology. However, the rea-
soning in those decisions clearly was influenced by the contemporaneous emergence of for-
mal rules governing contract formation, a process which took place between approximately.
1790 and 1830. See P. ATIYAH, supra note 41, at 446-47.
95. Clay v. Willan, 1 H. Bl. 298, 298, 126 Eng. Rep. 174, 174 (C.P. 1789). For another
example, see Izett v. Mountain, 4 East 371, 371, 102 Eng. Rep. 873, 873 (K.B. 1803).
96. The insurance premium had to be reasonable. Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264, 271-
72, 128 Eng. Rep. 105, 108 (C.P. 1810); see note 41 supra. A carrier could waive the usual
requirement that the premium be paid in advance. Wilson v. Freeman, 3 Camp. 527, 170
Eng. Rep. 1470 (N.P. 1814). If the carriage company had more than one owner, however, all
had to join in waiving the notice's demands. Bignold v. Waterhouse, 1 M. & S. 255, 105 Eng.
Rep. 95 (K.B. 1813).
97. Clay v. Willan, 1 H. B1. 298, 126 Eng. Rep. 174 (C.P. 1789); Izett v. Mountain, 4 East
371, 102 Eng. Rep. 873 (K.B. 1803); Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East 507, 102 Eng. Rep. 1164
(K.B. 1804); Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264, 128 Eng. Rep. 105 (C.P. 1810); Bignold v.
Waterhouse, 1 M. & S. 255, 105 Eng. Rep. 95 (K.B. 1813); Down v. Fromont, 4 Camp. 40,
816
CARRIERS' RIGHT TO REJECT
the shipper's declaration had to allege specifically that he had sat-
isfied each condition precedent 8 The other, less frequently used
type of notice typically provided: "[N]o more than [£5] will be ac-
counted for, for any goods or parcels delivered at this office, unless
entered as such and paid for accordingly."9 9 This species of notice,
unlike the first, left the carrier unconditionally liable for un-
declared valuables but fixed a ceiling on the amount which the
shipper could recover. In other words, it functioned like a liqui-
dated damages clause. The shipper did not have to mention this
type of special acceptance in his declaration because the damages
agreement was collateral to the main carriage contract.100
By 1800 public-notice disclaimers had become a ubiquitous fea-
ture of the English transport system, a development not everyone
welcomed. Several judges bemoaned creation of the doctrine that
allowed substitution of pro-carrier contract terms for pro-shipper
common-law rules. In 1802 Justice Alan Chambre of the Common
Pleas said the public-notice special acceptance had been "extended
as far or rather farther than it ought to be upon principles of pub-
lic policy." 101 Two years later Lord Ellenborough, chief justice of
the King's Bench, complained that notices were "liable to
abuse,110 2 and in 1810 Sir James Mansfield, the Common Pleas
chief justice, grumbled that special acceptances produced "great
frauds" and "great inconvenience."103 Lord Ellenborough pointedly
remarked in 1814 that he was "very sorry for the convenience of
trade, that carriers have been allowed to limit their common law
responsibility," and asserted that "some legislative measure upon
the subject will soon become necessary." Parliament did nothing,
171 Eng. Rep. 13 (N.P. 1814); Levi v. Waterhouse, 1 Price 280, 145 Eng. Rep. 1403 (Ex.
1815); Thorogood v. Marsh, Gow. 105, 171 Eng. Rep. 853 (N.P. 1819); Batson v. Donovan, 4
B. & Ald. 21, 106 Eng. Rep. 846 (K.B. 1820); Alfred v. Home, 3 Stark 136, 171 Eng. Rep.
799 (N.P. 1822); Lowe v. Booth, 13 Price 329, 147 Eng. Rep. 1007 (Ex. 1824); Mayhew v.
Eames, 3 B. & C. 601, 107 Eng. Rep. 856 (K.B. 1825); Marsh v. Home, 5 B. & C. 322, 108
Eng. Rep. 120 (K.B. 1826).
98. Latham v. Rutley, 2 B. & C. 20, 22, 107 Eng. Rep. 290, 291 (K.B. 1823). See also
Clarke v. Gray, 6 East 564, 102 Eng. Rep. 1404 (K.B. 1805).
99. Clarke v. Gray, 6 East 564, 565, 102 Eng. Rep. 1404, 1405 (K.B. 1805).
100. Clarke v. Gray, 6 East 564, 102 Eng. Rep. 1404 (K.B. 1805).
101. Oppenheim v. Russell, 3 Bos. & Pul. 41, 52, 127 Eng. Rep. 24, 30 (C.P. 1802).
102. Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East 507, 513, 102 Eng. Rep. 1164, 1167 (K.B. 1804).
103. Harris v. Packwood, 3 Taunt. 264, 271, 128 Eng. Rep. 105, 108 (C.P. 1810).
104. Down v. Fromont, 4 Camp. 40, 41, 171 Eng. Rep. 13, 14 (N.P. 1814).
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
however, and the judges' groans grew louder as it dawned on them
that, having permitted disclaimers of liability for undeclared valu-
ables, they soon would find themselves hard-pressed to conceive a
principled basis for denying carriers the right to contract out of
liability altogether.105 "The doctrine of carriers exempting them-
selves from liability by notice has been carried much too far,"
groused Justice James Park of the Common Pleas in an 1818 deci-
sion.' His colleague Justice James Burrough used somewhat
stronger language, saying he "lament[ed] that the doctrine of no-
tice was ever introduced into Westminster-Hall.' ' 0 7 Burrough re-
newed his attack on carriers' practices a few years later when he
took them to task for "constantly endeavouring to narrow their re-
sponsibility, and to creep out of their duties," adding that he was
"not singular in thinking that their endeavours ought not to be
favoured."108 Noting carrier employees' propensity for "leaguing
with thieves," in 1827 Common Pleas' Chief Justice William Best
said he wished "these notices had never been holden sufficient to
limit the carrier's responsibility. '" 109
Forced to administer a doctrine many of them vehemently dis-
liked, early nineteenth-century judges did what they could to nar-
row its reach. Their first tactic was to tighten the offer-and-accept-
ance rules governing modification of common-law liability. They
devised an elaborate set of rules1 prescribing what carriers had to
do to "bring home" their notices to shippers."'1 Awareness of trade
105. See Maving v. Todd, 1 Stark. 72, 73-74, 171 Eng. Rep. 405, 405 (N.P. 1815). See also
Leeson v. Holt, 1 Stark. 186, 187-88, 171 Eng. Rep. 441, 442 (N.P. 1816).
106. Smith v. Home, 8 Taunt, 144, 146, 129 Eng. Rep. 338, 338 (C.P. 1818).
107. 8 Taunt. at 146, 129 Eng. Rep. at 339.
108. Duff v. Budd, 3 Brod. & B. 177, 183, 129 Eng. Rep. 1250, 1253 (C.P. 1822).
109. Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, 222-23, 130 Eng. Rep. 753, 754-55 (C.P. 1827).
110. Rules developed piecemeal because notices took so many different forms that a
workable general principle could not be devised. F. BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW
RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT Nisi Pawis 71a n.(a) (7th ed. R. Bridgman London 1817) (1st ed.
London 1772).
111. Early nineteenth-century judges insisted upon stronger proof that shippers possessed
actual knowledge of conditions precedent to liability than Mansfield's court had demanded.
Compare cases cited in notes 112-122 infra with Gibbon v. Paynton, 4 Burr. 2298, 2300,
2302, 98 Eng. Rep. 200, 201 (K.B. 1769). Carriers had to establish such knowledge through
circumstantial evidence rather than by cross-examining shippers because at this time the
parties to a lawsuit generally were incompetent to serve as witnesses. Adams, The Stand-
ardization of Commercial Contracts, or the Contractualization of Standard Forms, 7 AN-
GLO-AMER. L. REv. 136, 142 (1978).
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customs no longer provided an adequate substitute for seeing, or at
least hearing about, the notice itself.1 2 A disclaimer clause was in-
valid if printed in much smaller type than the rest of the notice.113
It also was ineffective if the shipper was illiterate" 4 or if, despite
being able to read the notice, he simply did not bother to do so. 15
A shipper who already had seen one of the carrier's handbills was
free to ignore an inconsistent sign."" Notwithstanding a plethora
of advertisements, leaflets, and office posters, a carrier exposed
himself to full common-law liability if he picked up the shipper's
goods in a wagon that lacked its own notice. 117 Similarly, posting
notices at the termini of his route afforded a carrier no protection
if he neglected to display one at the intermediate stop where he
received the shipper's consignment.118 The mere fact that the ship-
per subscribed to a newspaper in which the carrier's notice regu-
larly appeared did not prove he had actual knowledge of the car-
rier's conditions. 9 Ambiguity also proved fatal; a notice had to
make clear that noncompliance immunized the carrier himself and
not just the proprietor of the office whence the freight was
shipped.120 Notice to a consignor served as notice to his consignee
and vice versa, at least where the former was the latter's agent.'21
112. Clarke v. Gray, 4 Esp. 177,1178, 170 Eng. Rep. 682, 683 (N.P. 1802).
113. Butler v. Heane, 2 Camp. 415, 170 Eng. Rep. 1202 (N.P. 1810).
114. Davis v. Willan, 2 Stark. 279, 171 Eng. Rep. 646 (N.P. 1817).
115. Kerr v. Willan, 2 Stark. 53, 171 Eng. Rep. 570 (N.P. 1817), 6 M. & S. 150, 105 Eng.
Rep. 1199 (K.B. 1817).
116. Cobden v. Bolton, 2 Camp. 108, 170 Eng. Rep. 1097 (N.P. 1809). Likewise, a shipper
who saw a sign limiting the carrier's liability and subsequently obtained a receipt containing
terms less favorable to the carrier could ignore the former and rely on the latter. Munn v.
Baker, 2 Stark. 255, 171 Eng. Rep. 638 (N.P. 1817).
117. Clayton v. Hunt, 3 Camp. 27, 170 Eng. Rep. 1294 (N.P. 1811).
118. Gouger v. Jolly, Holt 317, 171 Eng. Rep. 257 (N.P. 1816). But by posting a notice at
only one terminus, a carrier could bind a consignee of goods sent from the other terminus by
an agent who, like his principal, knew the carrier made round trips between the termini.
Riley v. Home, 2 Moo. & P. 331, 344-45, 5 Bing. 217, 227-28, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044, 1047-48
(C.P. 1828).
119. Rowley v. Home, 3 Bing. 2, 130 Eng. Rep. 413 (C.P. 1825); Munn v. Baker, 2 Stark.
255, 171 Eng. Rep. 638 (N.P. 1817). But the shipper would be bound by the newspaper
notice if the jury found he had read it. 2 A. STEPHENS, THE LAw OF Nisi PRIUS, EVIDENCE IN
CIVIL ACTIONS, AND ARBITRATION AND AwARDs *998 (Amer. ed. G. Sharswood 1844); S.
GREENLEAF, A TREATISE ON THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 216 (15th ed. S. Croswel 1892).
120. Macklin v. Waterhouse, 5 Bing. 212, 225, 130 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1047 (C.P. 1828).
121. Maing v. Todd, 1 Stark. 72, 171 Eng. Rep. 405 (N.P. 1815); Alfred v. Home, 3
Stark. 136, 171 Eng. Rep. 799 (N.P. 1822); Mayhew v. Eames, 1 Car. & P. 550, 171 Eng. Rep.
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Although notice to a servant bound his or her master, a carrier had
to be sure the servant knew enough about the cargo and about a
shipper's legal duties to declare and insure the goods properly, for
if he did not, the carrier faced unlimited liability.122
Anti-notice judges' second tactic was to read qualifying language
into facially absolute disclaimers. They held that disclosure of
cargo value was a condition precedent to liability only if such in-
formation would have influenced the carrier's level of safety pre-
cautions. To describe loss-producing conduct that bore no causal
relation to nondisclosure, courts employed the terms "misfea-
sance" and "gross negligence." Misfeasance occurred when a car-
rier wilfully renounced his duty to transport cargo in the manner
he and the shipper had agreed upon. Examples included carrying
cargo beyond its designated destination,123 sending goods by an-
other company's conveyance without authorization,12" and failing
to furnish a seaworthy craft.125 Gross negligence consisted of failing
1312 (N.P. 1825), 3 B. & C. 601, 107 Eng. Rep. 856 (K.B. 1825).
122. Macklin v. Waterhouse, 5 Bing. 212, 226-27, 130 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1047 (C.P. 1828).
123. Ellis v. Turner, 8 T.R. 530, 101 Eng. Rep. 1529 (K.B. 1800); Bodenham v. Bennett, 4
Price 31, 146 Eng. Rep. 384 (Ex. 1817). Allocation of the burden of proof played an impor-
tant role in determining which party ultimately had to bear the loss. If a carrier failed to
show that his disclaimer notice had been "brought home" to the shipper, he had the burden
of proving that the loss or damage resulted from an act of God or the king's enemies. Failure
to discharge that burden saddled the carrier with liability whether or not he was at fault. S.
GREENLEAF, supra note 119, § 219; W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs NOT
UNDER SEAL § 463 (Boston 1844). If the carrier brought his notice to the shipper's attention
and the shipper did not comply with its conditions, the burden of proof shifted, and the
shipper then had to prove that the carrier caused the loss or damage by committing an act
of misfeasance or gross negligence. W. STORY, supra, § 471; S. GREENLEAF, supra note 119, §
218.
124. Garnett v. Willan, 5 B. & Aid. 53, 106 Eng. Rep. 1113 (K.B. 1821); Sleat v. Fagg, 5 B.
& Ald. 342, 106 Eng. Rep. 1216 (K.B. 1822). But cf. Nicholson v. Willan, 5 East 507, 102
Eng. Rep. 1164 (K.B. 1804) (carrier who negligently booked goods on wrong coach also
owned by his company held not guilty of misfeasance).
In Sleat the court emphasized that "the defendant would have sent the parcel by the
same coach, even if the plaintiffs had described it as a parcel of value, inasmuch as all
parcels sent to the office before a certain hour, were forwarded by that coach; and, therefore,
the concealment of the value was not the cause of the non-performance of the contract." 5
B. & Aid. at 349-50, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1219 (per Holroyd, J.). The court also stressed the
jury's finding that, because the defendant used a "substituted mode of conveyance, the
property was exposed to greater risk than it would have been, had it been sent by the mode
elected by the plaintiffs." 5 B. & Ad. at 347-48, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1218 (per Abbott, C.J.).
125. Lyon v. Mells, 5 East 428, 102 Eng. Rep. 1134 (K.B. 1804).
820
1982] CARRIERS' RIGHT TO REJECT 821
to exercise care commensurate with cargo's apparent value. 26 Un-
declared goods presumptively were worth up to, but not more
than, the sum stated in the carrier's notice, e.g., £5.127 Hence, a
carrier was not guilty of gross negligence if he handled an un-
declared parcel stuffed with banknotes in a manner befitting prop-
erty valued at £5,128 but he lost his notice's protection if he treated
the package as though it were "not. . .worth two-pence. ' 129 Gross
negligence took several forms: leaving a parcel in the hands of a
126. See Bodenham v. Bennett, 4 Price 31, 33, 146 Eng. Rep. 384, 385 (Ex. 1817); Batson
v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. 21, 36, 42, 106 Eng. Rep. 846, 851, 853 (K.B. 1820); Lowe v. Booth,
13 Price 329, 331, 147 Eng. Rep. 1007, 1008 (Ex. 1824); Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, 221-
23, 130 Eng. Rep. 753, 754-55 (C.P. 1827).
Ordinary negligence had a much broader meaning than gross negligence: "every thing is a
negligence in a carrier or hoyman that the law does not excuse." Dale v. Hall, 1 Wils. K.B.
281, 282 (K.B. 1750). Failure to take precautions proportionate to cargo's actual worth con-
stituted ordinary negligence. If the carrier's lack of due care resulted from the shipper's
nondisclosure of his goods' nature and value, the carrier's notice insulated him from liabil-
ity. Thus, a shipper was not "allowed to complain of a negligent performance of the contract
by the carrier, where that negligence [was] occasioned by the [shipper's] own act, viz. by his
treating the parcel as a thing of no value." Sleat v. Fagg, 5 B. & Aid. 342, 347, 106 Eng. Rep.
1216, 1218 (K.B. 1822) (per Abbott, C.J.). Put another way, a shipper "could not make...
negligence a ground of action" if "he had superinduced it by his own neglect, in not commu-
nicating the value of the parcel to the [carrier]." 5 B. & Ad. at 348, 106 Eng. Rep. at 1218
(per Bayley, J.). See also Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. at 35-37, 106 Eng. Rep. at 851-52
(K.B. 1820).
127. A shipper could rebut the presumption by proving that, when the cargo changed
hands, the carrier knew its value exceeded £5. See Bodenham v. Bennett, 4 Price 31, 146
Eng. Rep. 384 (Ex. 1817). Although the carrier's level of knowledge affected his duty of care,
and thus helped determine whether he committed gross negligence, knowledge alone did not
strip him of his notice's protection. Prior to 1815, if a carrier knowingly accepted property
worth over £5 without requiring a formal declaration of value and advance payment of an
insurance premium, he impliedly waived those conditions precedent to liability. Beck v. Ev-
ans, 16 East 244, 247-48, 104 Eng. Rep. 1081, 1082-83 (MB. 1812). See also Wilson v. Free-
man, 3 Camp. 527, 528, 170 Eng. Rep. 1470, 1470 (N.P. 1814); Down v. Fromont, 4 Camp.
40, 41, 171 Eng. Rep. 13, 14 (N.P. 1814). In Levi v. Waterhouse, 1 Price 280, 284-85, 145
Eng. Rep. 1403, 1404 (Ex. 1815), however, the Court of Exchequer rejected the concept of
implied waiver. See also Thorogood v. Marsh, Gow. 105, 171 Eng. Rep. 853 (N.P. 1819);
Alfred v. Home, 3 Stark. 136, 171 Eng. Rep. 799 (N.P. 1822). The King's Bench endorsed
Levi in Marsh v. Horne, 5 B. & C. 322, 327-28, 108 Eng. Rep. 120, 122 (K.B. 1826), laying to
rest the notion that a carrier's awareness of a consignment's actual value, without more,
deprived him of his right to insist upon full compliance with his notice's conditions. There-
after, he forfeited his right to invoke the notice as a defense to liability only if he handled
cargo in a manner inappropriate to its known worth.
128. See Batson v. Donovan, 4 B. & Aid. 21, 106 Eng. Rep. 846 (K.B. 1820).
129. Lowe v. Booth, 13 Price 329, 331, 147 Eng. Rep. 1007, 1008 (Ex 1824) (Graham, B.,
dissenting).
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drunken coachman after it had reached its destination; 30 permit-
ting brandy to leak out of a punctured cask; 1" sending only one
employee to deliver packages instead of the usual pair, thus expos-
ing the open and unguarded cart to theft;13 2 leaving a trunk behind
or fastening it insecurely to the top of a coach; 33 and delivering
goods to the wrong person.13 4
Despite hostile judges' attempts to diminish their potency, no-
tices remained enormously effective weapons in 1828, when Riley
was decided. By using a form disclaimer, a carrier could immunize
himself from liability for undisclosed, uninsured valuables pro-
vided he (1) brought the disclaimer to the shipper's attention; (2)
avoided willful default; and (3) based his risk calculations and cus-
todial conduct on the consignment's apparent value. During the
next quarter century, the tide turned even more decidedly in carri-
ers' favor as legislators and judges fostered technological innova-
tion and economic growth.
In 1830 Parliament passed "An Act for the more effectual Pro-
tection of Mail Contractors, Stage Coach Proprietors, and other
Common Carriers for Hire, against the Loss of or Injury to Parcels
or Packages delivered to them for Conveyance or Custody, the
Value and Contents of which shall not be declared to them by the
Owners thereof."''8s Known as the Carriers' Act, this statute, which
130. Bodenham v. Bennett, 4 Price 31, 146 Eng. Rep. 384 (Ex. 1817).
131. Beck v. Evans, 16 East 244, 104 Eng. Rep. 1081 (K.B. 1812).
132. Smith v. Horne, Holt 643, 171 Eng. Rep. 371 (N.P. 1818), 8 Taunt. 144, 129 Eng.
Rep. 338 (C.P. 1818). See also Beckford v. Crutwell, 5 Car. & P. 242, 172 Eng. Rep. 957
(N.P. 1832).
133. Brooke v. Pickwick, 4 Bing. 218, 130 Eng. Rep. 753 (C.P. 1827).
134. Birkett v. Willan, 2 B. & Ald. 356, 106 Eng. Rep. 397 (K.B. 1819); Duff v. Budd, 3
Brod. & B. 177, 129 Eng. Rep. 1250 (C.P. 1822).
135. Carriers' Act, 1830, 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 68. The Act's preamble stated that it was
designed to deal with three interrelated problems: (1) shippers' growing tendency to send
"Parcels and Packages containing Money, Bills, Notes, Jewellery, and other Articles of great
Value in small Compass," a practice which greatly increased both the danger of "Depreda-
tion" and carriers' exposure to potential liability; (2) consignors' frequent failure to inform
carriers of the nature and value of their cargo, thus thwarting the exercise of "due Dili-
gence"; and (3) the occasional ineffectiveness of disclaimers owing to "the Difficulty of fixing
Parties with Knowledge of Notices." Id. § 1.
Although the preamble referred specifically to parcels and packages of "small Compass,"
the Act's coverage extended to large containers as well. Owen v. Burnett, 2 C. & M. 353,
357-59, 149 Eng. Rep. 796, 798-99 (Ex. P1. 1834).
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applied to all common carriers by land 36 and covered luggage as
well as cargo, augmented rather than altered the protection carri-
ers already enjoyed at common law. Section 1 relieved common
carriers of all liability for loss of or injury to gold, silver, money,
jewelry, watches, silk, glass, china, paintings, writings, and other
enumerated materials, if worth more than £10, unless the shipper
declared the property's nature and value and paid an insurance
premium. 13 This statutory exclusion of liability worked automati-
cally: the carrier did not have to "bring home" any sort of notice to
the shipper, who conclusively was presumed to have knowledge of
the law's disclosure requirement. " In order to collect an insurance
premium, however, the carrier had to post a notice in his office
stating his tariff. This list of charges bound a shipper whether or
not he actually was aware of its existence. " 9 Upon receiving cargo
information 0 and a reasonable premium, the carrier became
subject to common-law strict liability.14 2 Failure to declare valu-
136. Sea carriers already enjoyed statutory, immunity from liability for undeclared valu-
ables lost or damaged due to "robbery, embezzlement, making away with, or secreting
thereof." 26 Geo. 3, c. 86, § 3 (1786).
137. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Win. 4, c. 68, § 1. Professor Richard Danzig has suggested that the
Act's disclosure requirement may have influenced the decision in Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex.
341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ex. 1854), which limited liability for breach of contract to such
damages as arose naturally from the breach or "such as may reasonably be supposed to have
been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the proba-
ble result of the breach of it." 9 Ex. at 354, 156 Eng. Rep. at 151 (per Alderson, B.). Danzig,
Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249,
264 (1975).
138. Hart v. Baxendale, 6 Ex. 769, 788-90, 155 Eng. Rep. 755, 764-65 (Exch. Ch. 1851); see
1 E. BOYLE & T. WAGHORN, THE LAW RELATING TO TRAFFIC ON RAILWAYS AND CANALS 46-47
(1901).
139. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 68, § 2. If the carrier failed to issue a receipt for the valu-
ables upon request, or if he collected premiums without posting a notice, he lost his protec-
tion under § 1 and became "liable and responsible as at the Common Law, and.., liable to
refund the increased Rate of Charge." Id. § 3.
140. An express formal declaration of value was required to avoid a § 1 automatic exclu-
sion of liability for enumerated items worth over £10. The shipper's duty to declare was
unaffected by the carrier's possession of actual knowledge concerning the cargo's nature and
value. See Boys v. Pink, 8 Car. & P. 361, 173 Eng. Rep. 531 (N.P. 1838).
141. Having declared his cargo's nature and value, a shipper owed no duty to offer an
insurance premium; the carrier had to demand it. Acceptance without such a demand
barred the carrier from asserting nonpayment as a defense to liability. Great N. Ry. v. Behr-
ens, 7 H. & N. 950, 158 Eng. Rep. 756 (Exch. Ch. 1862).
142. The shipper's recovery was limited to the property's actual value or its declared
value, whichever was less. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Win. 4, c. 68, § 9. In addition to damages, the
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ables or pay the proper premium barred a shipper from recovering
even though the loss or damage resulted from the carrier's gross
negligence.4 3 The Act did not exempt a carrier from liability for
wilful damage, conversion, intentional misdelivery,14 or employee
felony,145 however.
The Act allowed carriers to contract out of liability for property
not covered by a section 1 automatic disclaimer. Section 4 restated
the well-established principle that a carrier could not unilaterally
cast off his common-law responsibilities by means of a public no-
tice. 4 6 Section 6 made clear, however, that bilateral agreements
modifying common-law rights and duties remained valid. 47 To
enter into such an agreement, a carrier had to draw the shipper's
attention to a notice or give him a ticket or waybill reciting the
conditions under which the carrier wished to do business. 14 Ship-
ment of goods-even under protest-after the disclaimer had been
"brought home" signified assent to the carrier's terms. 4  A shipper
shipper also was entitled to recover his insurance premium. Id. § 7.
143. Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q.B. 646, 114 Eng. Rep. 253 (Q.B. 1842). See also Morritt v.
North E. Ry., 1 Q.B.D. 302 (Q.B.D.), af'd, 1 Q.B.D. 311 (C.A. 1876).
144. Morritt v. North E. Ry., 1 Q.B.D. 302, 308 (Q.B.D.), aff'd, 1 Q.B.D. 311 (C.A. 1876)
(dictum).
145. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Win. 4, c. 68, § 8. See Machu v. London & S.W. Ry., 2 Ex. 415, 154
Eng. Rep. 554 (Ex. 1848); Great N. [Great W.] Ry. v. Rimell, 18 C.B. 575, 139 Eng. Rep.
1495 (C.P. 1856); Metcalfe v. London, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry., 4 C.B. (N.S.) 307, 140 Eng.
Rep. 1102 (C.P. 1858); Stephens v. London & S.W. Ry., 18 Q.B.D. 121 (C.A. 1886). Notwith-
standing § 8, a carrier could contract out of liability for thefts committed by his employees.
See Shaw v. Great W. Ry., [1894] 1 Q.B. 373. See also Murray, The Warehouseman's and
Carrier's Liability for Theft By Their Employees In England and the United States, 39 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 707, 735-37 (1978).
146. 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Win. 4, c. 68, § 4. Nevertheless, the Act did not prohibit a carrier from
using a public notice to define the categories of goods he professed to carry. A. LESLIE, supra
note 17, at 106.
147. Section 6 stated that "nothing in this Act contained shall extend or be construed to
annul or in anywise affect any special Contract between such Mail Contractor, Stage Coach
Proprietor, or common Carrier, and any other Parties, for the Conveyance of Goods and
Merchandizes." 11 Geo. 4 & 1 Wm. 4, c. 68, § 6.
148. See Palmer v. Grand Junction Ry., 4 M. & W. 749, 150 Eng. Rep. 1624 (Ex. P1. 1839)
(notice held ineffective because no proof shipper received ticket bearing disclaimer); cf.
Walker v. Jackson, 10 M. & W. 161, 152 Eng. Rep. 424 (Ex. P1. 1842) (notice disclaiming
implied contractual liability held invalid because not posted where shippers could see it).
149. Walker v. York & N. Midland Ry., 2 El. & Bl. 750, 118 Eng. Rep. 948 (Q.B. 1853).
Thus, the Act did not diminish "the ease with which a carrier could impose conditions in his
own favour without any real assent on the part of the consignor." A. LESLIE, supra note 17,
at 97 (emphasis added). The shipper's assent, whether implied or express, was ineffective,
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who found those terms unacceptable could reject the carrier's offer
and, provided he was willing to declare his cargo and pay a reason-
able surcharge, insist that the carrier transport his goods subject to
full common-law liability. If the carrier declined to handle the con-
signment on that basis, the shipper could sue him in tort for
wrongful refusal to carry. 150
Until the late 1840s, judges bent over backwards to avoid con-
struing notices as disclaimers of liability for negligence. 151 In a se-
ries of cases decided between 1849 and 1852, however, all three
principal courts abandoned their former position and recognized
carriers' right to enforce agreements relieving them of responsibil-
ity for all degrees of carelessness.1 5 2 This about-face came directly
in response to the railway boom.1 53 Baron James Parke's judgment
in Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway1" illustrated how pro-
however, if procured by fraud. See Simons v. Great W. Ry., 2 C.B. (N.S.) 620, 140 Eng. Rep.
560 (C.P. 1857).
Like late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century special acceptances, contracts made
after passage of the Carriers' Act often predicated strict liability upon disclosure of cargo's
nature and value and upon payment of an insurance premium. A shipper who declared that
his consignment was worth a certain amount was estopped from later claiming that the
goods had a higher value. See M'Cance v. London & N.W. Ry., 7 H. & N. 477, 158 Eng. Rep.
559 (Ex. 1861), afl'd, 3 H. & C. 343, 159 Eng. Rep. 563 (Exch. Ch. 1864). If the shipper chose
to remain silent, paying only the basic freight rate, the contract relieved the carrier of his
insurance obligation. Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443, 151 Eng. Rep. 1113 (Ex. Pl 1841).
150. Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 7 Ex. 707, 712, 715-16, 155 Eng. Rep. 1133, 1135,
1137 (Ex. 1852) (dicta).
151. See Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443, 460-62, 151 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1120-21 (Ex. Pl.
1841).
152. Shaw v. York & N. Midland Ry., 13 Q.B. 347, 116 Eng. Rep. 1295 (Q.B. 1849); Austin
v. Manchester, Sheffield, & Lincolnshire Ry., 10 C.B. 454, 138 Eng. Rep. 181 (C.P. 1852);
Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 7 Ex. 707, 155 Eng. Rep. 1133 (Ex. 1852).
By the 1850s, the distinction between gross and ordinary negligence, see note 126 supra,
had become hopelessly blurred. See Wyld v. Pickford, 8 M. & W. 443, 460-61, 151 Eng. Rep.
1113, 1120 (Ex. P1. 1841); Hinton v. Dibbin, 2 Q.B. 646, 661, 114 Eng. Rep. 253, 258 (Q.B.
1842). See also Wilson v. Brett, 11 M. & W. 113, 116, 152 Eng. Rep. 737, 739 (Ex. P1. 1843).
Judges therefore abandoned the old terminology and held that carriers could contract out of
liability for any type of omission, "[w]hether ... called negligence merely, or gross negli-
gence, or culpable negligence." Austin v. Manchester, Sheffield, & Lincolnshire Ry., 10 C.B.
at 476, 138 Eng. Rep. at 190.
153. See P. BAGWELL, THE TRANSPORT REVOLUTION FROM 1770, at 92-95 (1974); T.
BARKER & C. SAVAGE, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF TRANSPORT IN BRTAIN 58-70 (3d ed. 1974);
H. DYos & D. ALDCROFT, BRITISH TRANSPORT 118-138 (1969); W. JACKMAN, THE DEVELOP-
MENT OF TRANSPORTATION IN MODERN ENGLAND ch. 7 (3d ed. 1966).
154. Carr v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry., 7 Ex. 707, 155 Eng. Rep. 1133 (Ex. 1852).
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foundly the transport revolution influenced judicial attitudes:
Prior to the time of the establishment of railways, the Courts
were in the habit of construing contracts between individuals
and carriers much to the disadvantage of the latter. By the in-
troduction of railways, a new description of property was car-
ried, and many articles are now transferred from one place to
another which had not been commonly carried before ...
[C]ontracts are now made with reference to this new state of
things; and it is very reasonable that carriers should be allowed
to make agreements for the purpose of protecting themselves
against the new risks and dangers of carriage to which they are
in modern times exposed.155
Railroads soon exploited this new freedom, using their domi-
nance of the transportation market to extract shippers' assent to
"stringent and oppressive" conditions. 156 Prompted by public dis-
quiet over railways' overreaching,15 7 Parliament passed the basi-
cally ineffectual Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854.15 Although
155. 7 Ex. at 712-13, 155 Eng. Rep. at 1136.
156. Peek v. N. Staffordshire Ry., 10 H.L.C. 473, 557, 11 Eng. Rep. 1109, 1141 (H.L. 1862-
63) (per Cockburn, C.J.). Sir Alexander Cockburn, chief justice of the Queen's Bench, told
the House of Lords that monopolization, coupled with the rise of freedom of contract, ena-
bled carriers to wield enormous power at shippers' expense:
There cannot be a.doubt that, practically speaking, the introduction of rail-
ways has destroyed the competition which formerly existed, and the effect of
which was to secure to the goods owner fair and reasonable terms .... [T]he
absence of other means of conveyance, as well as the increased rapidity of
transport, compels the owner of goods, at least for all the purposes of business,
to resort to railway conveyance. He is thus at the mercy of the carrier, and has
no alternative but to submit to any terms, however unjust and oppressive,
which the latter may think fit to impose.
... Masters of the field, railway companies lost no time in introducing into
their contracts conditions of immunity, not only against liability in respect of
loss or injury arising from circumstances beyond their control, but also against
liability in respect of loss or injury resulting from their own negligence, how-
ever gross and inexcusable. And to these stipulations courts of law felt them-
selves compelled to give effect, on the undeniable principle that, in the absence
of fraud or illegality, courts of justice are bound to give effect to conditions,
however stringent and oppressive, to which the parties to a contract have de-
liberately agreed.
10 H.L.C. at 556-57, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1141.
157. See A. MANcHESTzR, A MODERN LEGAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND AND WALES 1750-1950,
at 279 (1980).
158. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 31. The Act's express purpose was, in Chief Justice Cockburn's
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it neither disturbed the protection afforded by section 1 of the
Carriers' Act nor abridged the right to contract out of strict liabil-
ity, the 1854 Act restricted negligence disclaimers in two ways.
First, the Act provided that a contract limiting liability for "Neg-
lect or Default" did not bind a shipper unless he had signed it.115
By routinely requiring shippers to sign standard-form waybills
containing boilerplate exclusionary clauses, carriers could fulfill
this requirement fairly easily. Second, the Act stated that railway
and canal companies were liable for negligence "notwithstanding
any Notice, Condition, or Declaration" to the contrary unless a
judge found the exonerating provision "just and reasonable."160
This rule also proved only a minor hindrance to carriers, for, as
Professor P. S. Atiyah has remarked, "[slo long as the contract was
made in a just and reasonable way, the result would be deemed
just and reasonable."' 1 To conclude a procedurally satisfactory
agreement, all a railway or canal company had to do was offer a
shipper the option of purchasing negligence coverage at a reasona-
ble rate. If the shipper then chose to send his cargo at the reduced-
liability rate, he had no grounds for challenging the contract.
words, to protect "the public from the abuse of a power which the Legislature itself, by
assisting to create these great companies, had helped to bring into existence." Peek v. N.
Staffordshire Ry., 10 H.L.C. 473, 556, 11 Eng. Rep. 1109, 1141 (H.L. 1862-63). See also 133
PARL. DEB., H.L. (3d ser.) 601-05, 608-10 (May 19, 1854) (remarks of Earl of Derby, Lord
Lyndhurst, Earl Grey, & Lord Brougham); id. at 985-88 (May 26, 1854) (remarks of Earl of
Derby, Earl Grey, & Lord Lyndhurst).
For a thorough explanation of the Act, see A. LESLIE, supra note 17, at 98-105, 107-08,
111-52.
159. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 31, § 7.
160. Id. The terms "Notice, Condition, or Declaration" were considered synonyms for
"contract." See Peek v. N. Staffordshire Ry., 10 H.L.C. 473, 11 Eng. Rep. 1109 (H.L. 1862-
63); Simons v. Great W. Ry., 18 C.B. 805, 139 Eng. Rep. 1588 (C.P. 1856), judgment ren-
dered in London & N.W. Ry. v. Dunham, 18 C.B. 826, 829-30, 139 Eng. Rep. 1596, 1598
(C.P. 1856). According to Queen's Bench Justice Colin Blackburn, the task of determining a
condition's reasonableness was entrusted to a judge rather than to a jury because Parlia-
ment was impressed by carriers' argument "that the bias of a jury is so decidedly against
them, that, especially in the county courts, they do not get impartial justice." Peek v. N.
Staffordshire Ry., 10 H.L.C. at 510-11, 11 Eng. Rep. at 1124.
The 1854 Act fixed a ceiling on the amount a shipper could recover for injury to livestock
if he failed to declare its value and pay the surcharge listed on a tariff notice posted in
conformity with § 2 of the Carriers' Act. 17 & 18 Vict., c. 31, § 7; see text accompanying note
139 supra; Robinson v. London & S.W. Ry., 19 C.B. (N.S.) 51, 144 Eng. Rep. 704 (C.P.
1865).
161. P. ATiAH, supra note 41, at 559.
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Judges believed the availability of a fairly priced alternative to
limited liability furnished an adequate safeguard against
coercion. 16
2
III. CARRIERS' RIGHT TO REJECT UNDECLARED CARGO: MYTH AND
REALITY
As we have seen, by 1828, when Chief Justice Best delivered his
judgment in Riley, a prudent carrier no longer had reason to fear
closed containers. He could prevent insurance fraud simply by
making certain that each shipper either obtained a receipt or saw a
notice disclaiming liability for undeclared valuables. Having taken
that elementary step, the carrier could take charge of cargo with-
out worrying about whether he might face a ruinous claim if the
goods were lost, stolen, or damaged in transit. His special accept-
ance left him responsible only for gross negligence and misfea-
sance. A carrier never could be misled into committing gross negli-
gence because, by definition, such conduct consisted of failing to
handle cargo in a manner suited to its apparent value, which a
shipper could not distort. Similarly, if a carrier deliberately mis-
treated freight or intentionally violated the terms of his contract,
he had only himself to blame for giving the nondisclosing shipper a
windfall."' 3
By the time Crouch was decided in January 1854, liability for
gross as well as ordinary negligence had become excludable by con-
tract. The Railway and Canal Traffic Act, which went into effect in
July of that year, complicated matters only slightly by requiring
companies to offer alternative rates and to secure shippers' written
assent to agreements limiting liability for negligence. In addition to
their common-law rights, carriers enjoyed considerable statutory
protection. Section 1 of the Carriers' Act, 1830, relieved them of
162. See Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Ry. v. Brown, L.R. 7 App. Cas. 703 (H.L.
1883); Great W. Ry. v. Callaghan McCarthy, L.R. 12 App. Cas. 218 (H.L. 1887); Lewis v.
Great W. Ry., 3 Q.B.D. 195 (C.A. 1877). A contract was unreasonable if it disclaimed liabil-
ity for wilful misconduct. Ashendon v. London, Brighton, & S. Coast Ry., 5 Ex. D. 190
(1880). See also Willis, The Right of Bailees to Contract Against Liability for Negligence,
20 HARv. L. REv. 297, 307 (1907). But see A. LESLiE, supra note 17, at 110, 139-41 (contend-
ing that the Railway and Canal Traffic Act's reasonableness requirement did not apply to
contracts relieving carriers of liability for deliberate misconduct or conversion).
163. See text accompanying notes 123-134 supra.
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responsibility for undisclosed money, jewelry, and most other types
of valuable property unless the loss or damage resulted from inten-
tional wrongdoing or a carrier employee's felony.1 ' Furthermore,
dicta in Walker v. Jackson"e5 and statements by leading commen-
tators 66 suggest that fraud simpliciter constituted an independent
ground for denying a shipper recovery. The carrier also prevailed if
the goods were not of the type he held himself out as willing to
carry. 6 7 Collectively these rules guaranteed just compensation for
risk taking.
Having examined the history of liability doctrines, we must now
delineate the circumstances under which nineteenth-century En-
glish common law permitted a carrier to reject undeclared cargo.
Riley affords us no guidance, for, contrary to the Sixth Circuit's
implication in Rodriguez,"6 8 Chief Justice Best's dicta expressed
his own idiosyncratic views rather than settled principles. Best,
one biographer tells us, "was apt to form hasty and questionable
opinions."' 69 His sweeping and utterly unsupportable assertions in
Riley exemplified that tendency. Best claimed that in all instances
a carrier had the right to know what cargo contained and always
could reject a consignment if he did not get the information he
sought. 170 In Crouch the Common Pleas found "not a shadow of
authority" to support Best's obiter and concluded that the pro-
position he advanced "in its generality cannot stand the test of
reasoning."' 7' Crouch indicated, moreover, that even if the Riley
164. See notes 137, 145 & accompanying text supra.
165. 10 M. & W. 161, 168-69, 152 Eng. Rep. 424, 428 (Ex. P1. 1842).
166. J. ANGELL, supra note 18, §§ 258-261, 264; T. CHrrrv & L. TmEix, supra note 18, at
*32; J. KENT, supra note 41, at 468; J. SMrrH, A COMPENDIUM OF MERCANT LAw 275-76
(Amer. ed. J. Holcombe & W. Gholson New York 1847); J. STORY, supra note 18, §§ 565-569.
See also W. MACNAmARA & W. ROBERTSON, supra note 18, at 31-32.
167. Belfast & Ballymena Ry. v. Keys, 9 H.L.C. 556, 11 Eng. Rep. 846 (H.L. 1861); Great
N. Ry. v. Shepherd, 8 Ex. 30, 155 Eng. Rep. 1246 (Ex. 1852); Cahill v. London & N.W. Ry.,
10 C.B. (N.S.) 154, 142 Eng. Rep. 409 (C.P. 1861), aff'd, 13 C.B. (N.S.) 818, 143 Eng. Rep.
322 (Exch. Ch. 1863). In each of these cases, the carrier was held not liable for undeclared
merchandise inside a passenger's luggage.
168. See text p. 797-98 supra.
169. 9 E. Foss, supra note 85, at 12.
170. See note 27 supra.
171. Crouch v. London & N.W. Ry., 14 C.B. 255, 295, 139 Eng. Rep. 105, 121 (C.P. 1854)
(per Maule, J.). For over a century and a quarter, American scholars have recognized that
Crouch repudiated Best's Riley dicta. See, e.g., J. CHrrrY & L. TEMPLE, supra note 18, at
*32 n.(c), *50; J. SCHOULMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF BALMENTS 376 (1880). Justice
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dicta were read narrowly and confined to cargo rejected for the
purpose of preventing insurance fraud, Best's position still would
not pass muster.
Crouch was an action against a railroad for wrongfully refusing
to carry "packed parcels" (containers of smaller packages) between
cities the company publicly professed to serve. The railway con-
tended that rejection was warranted because the shipper had
rebuffed its demand for disclosure of each package's contents. The
court ruled in the shipper's favor, finding the railway's actions un-
necessary and therefore tortious. The justices adopted a need-to-
know test for deciding whether, on the facts of a particular case, a
carrier properly could decline to serve someone who failed to an-
swer his questions. In Chief Justice John Jervis's view, before a
carrier could make declaration of contents a condition precedent to
his transporting (as opposed to insuring) a package, he had to have
"a reasonable ground for requiring that information.' 1 72 Justice
William Maule said a carrier had to have a "special ground"17' for
insisting upon disclosure, and Justice Cresswell Cresswell asserted
that rejection was privileged only if "it was essential that the [car-
rier] should receive this information. ' 17 4 In short, the common law
Field's opinion in The Nitro-glycerine Case, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 524, 535 (1872) manifests
similar awareness by the Supreme Court. Apparently Riley's fall from grace escaped the
notice of both the Sixth Circuit and Jasper Ridley, author of the English textbook cited in
Rodriguez. See note 25 supra.
Crouch, like Riley and Rodriguez, dealt primarily with carriers' common-law rights. Ex-
cept for a couple of references to the Carriers' Act, 1830, and to railroads' statutory power to
refuse possibly dangerous cargo, see notes 175 infra; notes 14-15 & accompanying text
supra, Crouch did not canvass carriers' legislatively created privileges. For purposes of this
Article, common-law rights are the only ones that matter since they alone formed the basis
for the Sixth Circuit's historical observations in Rodriguez. Nevertheless, in the interest of
completeness, one should note that the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 & 9
Vict., c. 20, §§ 98-99, gave railway companies much greater powers than they enjoyed at
common law, as interpreted by Crouch. To help companies calculate the appropriate car-
riage charge, the Railways Clauses Consolidation Act authorized them to demand written
information regarding packages' contents. If the shipper failed to comply or answered
falsely, intending to evade the applicable freight rate, he had to pay a penalty plus the
correct toll. See Barr, Moering & Co. v. London & N.W. Ry., [1905] 2 K.B. 113. The Act did
not confer authority to reject or inspect undeclared parcels, however. See generally W.
MACNAMARA & W. ROBERTSON, supra note 18, at 137-40.
172. 14 C.B. at 291-92, 139 Eng. Rep. at 120.
173. 14 C.B. at 295, 139 Eng. Rep. at 121.
174. 14 C.B. at 296, 139 Eng. Rep. at 122.
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allowed a carrier to withhold his services only if there existed no
other way to protect his legitimate interests.
Under Crouch's least-intrusive-means analysis, a carrier had the
right to inspect or reject a parcel he reasonably suspected of con-
taining a hazardous substance, for, as a practical matter, he had no
other method of safeguarding employees, passengers, and property.
After all, disclaimers offered no insulation against explosives and
nitric acid. Hidden valuables presented an altogether different
problem, however. Unlike a carton of dynamite, a nail-bag full of
money was not intrinsically dangerous. It posed a threat solely be-
cause the common law made the carrier an insurer. Consequently,
once the carrier's underwriting obligation disappeared, the bag's
capacity to hurt him likewise vanished. As Chief Justice Jervis ob-
served in Crouch, a carrier did not have to take the radical step of
refusing cargo in order to avoid being victimized by dishonest
shippers:
[W]ith regard to goods of a peculiar value, or of a particular
description, if their value be not disclosed at the time they are
delivered to the company, the law ... provides a remedy; the
liability of the company is qualified and the party sending them
is, by reason of the concealment, prevented from recovering the
full value of the goods.175
Having created a satisfactory substitute, the common law outlawed
using rejection as a fraud-prevention measure.
Given the disclaimer's advanced state of development in 1828,
the Common Pleas ought to have employed in Riley the same rea-
soning utilized a quarter of a century later in Crouch. Chief Justice
Best reached the wrong conclusion in Riley because he presup-
posed a conundrum which never existed. He recognized, correctly,
that forcing carriers to insure property they knew nothing about
put them in an intolerable predicament. 176 He erred, however, in
assuming that refusal to take physical custody of undeclared cargo
provided carriers' only sure way out of their plight. Although
aware of carriers' power to limit their liability by notice,177 Best
175. 14 C.B. at 291, 139 Eng. Rep. at 120.
176. Riley v. Home, 2 Moo. & P. 331, 337-38, 5 Bing. 217, 220-21, 130 Eng. Rep. 1044,
1045 (C.P. 1828).
177. The actual question for decision in both Riley and its companion case, Macklin v.
1982]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
failed to grasp that acceptance of custody and acceptance of re-
sponsibility were separate concepts. He did not fully understand
that, thanks to disclaimers, a carrier could become a bailee without
necessarily incurring the obligations of an insurer. 178 In Crouch, by
contrast, the court comprehended the distinction between physical
acceptance and legal acceptance. Chief Justice Jervis and his col-
leagues saw the crucial point which Best's custody fixation had
caused him to miss: the ability to limit or exclude liability for un-
disclosed valuables afforded carriers all the protection they needed
against insurance fraud.
CONCLUSION
Nineteenth-century English common law prohibited a carrier
from rejecting undeclared cargo except as a last resort. If able to
protect his interests by any means short of refusal to carry, he had
to do so or face liability for breaching his duty to serve all ship-
pers. By disclaiming responsibility for undisclosed valuables, a car-
rier could prevent dishonest exploitation of his status as an in-
surer. Therefore, fraud avoidance did not furnish a lawful
justification for declining to transport closed containers. Riley and
Rodriguez erred in suggesting otherwise.
Why was rejection allowed only as a last resort? Because the
common law sought to forestall needless invasions of shippers' pri-
vacy. Although the judges who decided Crouch did not articulate
their concern for privacy rights, their intent seems unmistakable.
The rules they laid down plainly were designed to thwart intrusive
conduct on the part of powerful carriers.179 The judges knew full
Waterhouse, 5 Bing. 212, 130 Eng. Rep. 1042 (C.P. 1828), was whether, under the circum-
stances, the defendants' notices effectively disclaimed liability for undisclosed valuables.
178. Best evidently missed or disregarded King's Bench Chief Justice Charles Abbott's
observation, "A person may engage to place goods in a course of conveyance and delivery,
and yet declare that he will not be answerable for their loss." Marsh v. Home, 5 B. & C. 322,
326, 108 Eng. Rep. 120, 122 (K.B. 1826).
179. Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis contended that nineteenth-century English
courts recognized privacy as a legally protectible interest. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890). Crouch, which Warren and Brandeis overlooked, fur-
nishes stronger support for their claim than many of their citations provided. See generally
Pratt, The Warren and Brandeis Argument for a Right to Privacy, 1975 PuB. L. 161 (as-
serting that the cases relied upon by Warren and Brandeis protected property rather than
privacy).
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well that in an increasingly monopolistic market shippers trapped
between the Scylla of disclosure and the Charybdis of rejection al-
most invariably would choose conveyance over privacy. To spare
shippers that harsh election, Chief Justice Jervis and his brethren
gave consignors the option of either declaring the nature and value
of their goods, receiving insurance coverage in return, or keeping
that information secret, assuming the risk of loss or damage.
Under Crouch, the price of privacy was merely loss of insurance,
whereas under Best's Riley dicta the cost was much higher-loss of
transport. By repudiating Riley, the Court of Common Pleas reaf-
firmed principles dating back at least as far as Coke's time18 ° and
struck a wise balance between the competing interests of shippers
and carriers. The Sixth Circuit's resurrection of Riley misrepre-
sented history and demonstrated a lamentable disregard for ship-
pers' rights.
180. See note 78 & accompanying text supra.
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